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Taking The High Road: Why Prosecutors Should
Voluntarily Waive Peremptory Challenges
MAUREEN A. HowARD1
ABSTRACT
A fundamental tenet of the American justice system is that an impartial jury is
an essential component of a fair trial. In addition to a litigant's right to have his or
her case decided by jurors free of bias or prejudice, individual citizens enjoy a
separate right to be considered for jury service without the taint of improper
discrimination. Scholars have called for the elimination of peremptory challenges
in jury selection, arguing they lack utility and are exercised in an unconstitution-
ally discriminatory manner.
No one, however, has proposed that prosecutors should voluntarily waive
peremptory challenges even if the general practice is retained. A prosecutor's
ethical duty goes beyond advocacy; unlike other lawyers, the prosecutor is
uniquely duty-bound to "seek justice." Prosecutors' use of peremptory challenges
is an exercise of discretion to be evaluated against this distinct ethical standard. A
prosecutor cannot deny that peremptory challenges may be exercised in violation
of the Equal Protection Clause at least some of the time by some of the lawyers in
her office. In addition, prosecutors cannot always elicit adequate information
about prospective jurors to form rationally-ba sed reasons for excusing jurors
peremptorily, which raises a separate concern about a prosecutor's exercise of
peremptory challenges as an irrational, arbitrary, and capricious governmental
act.
Peremptory challenges are not themselves constitutionally guaranteed; rather,
they are a prophylactic safeguard of the constitutional right to an impartial jury,
subject to cost-benefit scrutiny. On the one hand, to what extent does the practice
risk unconstitutional discrimination, damaging both the actual and perceived
fairness and reliability of the prosecution process? On the other hand, to what
extent does the practice actually increase the likelihood of a just conviction? In
balancing the two, is the benefit of one outweighed by the detriment to the other?
1. Assistant Professor, University of Washington School of Law. The author served as a Deputy Prosecuting
Attorney for King County in Seattle, Washington and dedicates this article to former King County Prosecutor
Norm Maleng (1939-2007), one of the most brilliant and ethical lawyers of our time. It was he who planted the
seed for this article. The author thanks the following people for their insightful comments on earlier drafts:
Helen Anderson, Tom Andrews, Laura Appleman, Jeffrey Dobbins, Christopher Howard, W. H. (Joe) Knight,
Deborah Maranville, Todd Maybrown, Dana Raigrodski, Hari Osofsky, Ellen Yaroshefsky, Mary Whisner, and
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In this Article, I review the efficacy of peremptory challenges and conclude
that both empirical and anecdotal evidence confirm such challenges are of little
utility. I contend that the marginal benefit of peremptory challenges to a criminal
prosecutor is outweighed by the damage done to both the actual and perceived
fairness of the system, and that imbalance should persuade prosecutors to
consider a wholesale voluntary waiver of peremptory challenges.
INTRODUCTION
A fundamental tenet of the American justice system is that an impartial jury is
critical to providing a fair trial to liiigants.2 In addition to a criminal defendant's
right to have his case decided by jurors free of bias or prejudice, individual
citizens enjoy a separate right to be considered for jury service without the taint
of improper discrimination.3 Efforts to seat an impartial jury cannot infringe on
the constitutional rights of prospective jurors.4
A number of scholars and commentators have criticized the use of peremptory
2. "Juries are supposed to serve a number of important functions. Formally their task is to engage in sound
fact finding from the evidence produced at trial. However, juries are also supposed to represent the various
views of the community, serve as a political body, and, through rendering fair and just verdicts, provide
legitimacy for the legal system. A jury that is not representative of the community is likely to fail in these
functions." NEtL ViDMAR & VALERE P. HANS, AMEIcAN JuRIEs: THE VERDicr 66 (2007). See also American
Bar Association, Principles for Juries and Jury Trials 3 (2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/
juryprojectstandards/principles.pdf (last visited Feb. 11, 2010).
3. The Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), held that the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited the state prosecutor from exercising peremptory challenges based on
race. This constitutional prohibition was extended to ethnicity in Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991),
and to gender in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. TB., 511 U.S. 127 (1994). A party need not be of the same race as
the challenged juror to raise the issue. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) (white defendant may object to
prosecutor's challenge of minority jurors). The protection against discrimination in jury selection applies to
private litigants in civil cases. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991). The prohibition
against discrimination in exercising peremptory challenges extends to all parties, including a criminal
defendant. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992) (holding racial discrimination in jury selection
undermines public confidence in the fairness of the jury system regardless of who exercises the discriminat6ry
challenge). This standard may eventually be extended to prohibit the exercise of peremptory challenges based
on sexual orientation. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 610 (1996) (finding Colorado constitutional
amendment violated equal protection where it attempted to prohibit all legislative, executive, or judicial action
designed to protect homosexual individuals from discrimination). In the federal system, The Jury Selection and
Services Act prohibits discrimination as well. 28 U.S.C. § 1862 (2009) ("No citizen shall be excluded from
service as a grand or petit juror in the district courts of the United States on account of race, color, religion, sex,
national origin, or economic status."). State constitutions and/or legislation may similarly broaden the pro-
tections afforded a prospective juror from discrimination in jury selection beyond those articulated in Batson
and its progeny. For example, the Washington State Constitution provides that no person shall be incompetent as
a juror "in consequence of his opinion on matters of religion." WASH CONST. art. I, § 11. It remains unclear
whether this constitutional provision triggers a Batson analysis. See Justin Dolan, Thou Shall Not Strike:
Religion-Based Peremptory Challenges Under the Washington State Constitution, 25 SEArrn.E U. L. RE. 451
(Fall 2001).
4. See citations and accompanying text, supra note 3. The thread of these cases is that citizens have a right to
be considered for and participate in jury service, free of discrimination. See Barbara D. Underwood, Ending
Race Discrimination in Jury Selection: Whose Right is it, Anyway?, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 725, 742-50 (1992).
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challenges precisely because they are used discriminatorily and thus unconstitu-
tionally. 5 One commentator referred to the peremptory challenge as a "weapon of
prejudice."6 Another denounced peremptory challenges as being "probably the
single most significant means by which.., prejudice and bias [are] injected into
the jury selection system."7 Yet another referred to unrestricted peremptory
challenges as "the last bastion of undisguised racial discrimination in the criminal
justice system."' 8 At least one federal judge voiced her concern about the abuse of
peremptory challenges by banning them in her courtroom, calling them a
violation of equal protection. 9 Some U.S. Supreme Court justices have also
questioned whether the detriments associated with the use of peremptory
challenges outweigh the intended benefits, producing a net harm. 10 Justice
Thurgood Marshall, in his concurring opinion in Batson v. Kentucky,1" grimly
predicted that discriminatory use of peremptory challenges would continue,
despite the constitutional prohibition against prosecutors' use of peremptory
challenges as pretexts for invidious racial discrimination. The cure for such
discrimination, he wrote, was the elimination of peremptory challenges en-
tirely. 1
2
5. See, e.g., Jose Felipe Anderson, Catch Me If You Can! Resolving The Ethical Tragedies In the Brave New
World of Jury Selection, 32 NEw ENG. L. REV. 343 (1998); Felice Banker, Note, Eliminating A Safe Haven for
Discrimination: Why New York Must Ban Peremptory Challenges From Jury Selection, 3 J.L. POL'Y 605
(1995); Judge Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury Selection: The Problems
of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed Solutions, 4 HARv. L. & POL'Y REv.
149 (2010); Raymond J. Broderick, Why Peremptory Challenge Should Be Abolished, 65 TEMP. L. REv. 369
(1992); Carol A. Chase & Colleen P. Graffy, A Challenge For Cause Against Peremptory Challenges in
Criminal Proceedings, 19 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 507 (1997); Brent J. Gurney, The Case for
Abolishing Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Trials, 21 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 227 (1986); Morris B.
Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should Be Abolished: A Trial Judge's Perspective, 64 U. Cma. L. REv. 809
(1997); Eric D. Katz, Striking the Peremptory Challenge from Civil Litigation: "Hey Batson, Stay Where You
Belong!", 11 PACE L. REv. 357 (1991); Andrew D. Leipold, Constitutionalizing Jury Selection in Criminal
Cases: A Critical Evaluation, 86 GEo. L.J. 945 (1998); Nancy S. Marder, Justice Stevens, The Peremptory
Challenge, and The Jury, 74 FoRDuAM L. REv. 1683 (2006); Charles J. Ogletree, Just Say No!: A Proposal to
Eliminate Racially Discriminatory Uses of Peremptory Challenges, 31 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 1099 (1994); Antony
Page, Batson's Blind-Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REv. 155
(2005); Amy Wilson, The End of Peremptory Challenges: A Call For Change Through Comparative Analysis,
32 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMp. L. REv. 363 (2009); Hiroshi Fukurai & Edgar W. Butler, Sources of Racial
Disenfranchisement in the Jury and Jury Selection System, 13 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 238 (1994).
6. Katz, supra note 5, at 361.
7. Carl H. Imlay, Federal Jury Reformation: Saving a Democratic Institution, 6 Loy. L. REv. 247, 270
(1973).
8. Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review
of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. Cmi. L. REv. 153, 167 (1989).
9. Mark Hansen, Peremptory-Free Zone: A Federal Judge Won't Allow Such Challenges in Her Courtroom,
82 A.B.A. J. 26 (Aug. 1996) (discussing Minetos v. City University of New York, No. 92 Civ. 8785 (May 9,
1996)).
10. See Miller-el v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring); John Paul Stevens, Foreword:
Symposium on the Jury at a Crossroad: The American Experience, 78 Ciu.-KENT L. REv. 907 (2003).
11. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
12. Id. at 103.
2010]
THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHIcs
The fact that peremptory challenges have been widely indicted should
sufficiently motivate a prosecutor to reevaluate the discretionary use of such
challenges. This Article argues for an office-wide policy of peremptory waiver by
criminal prosecutors, although some waiver arguments apply to civil prosecutors
and defense counsel as well. The unique litigation role and ethical responsibilities
of criminal prosecutors, however, make them particularly suited to a cost-benefit
analysis of peremptory challenges.
In the criminal justice system, the relationship of the parties is unique. A
prosecutor stands in the place of the sovereign with the full weight and powers of
the government, including the power to investigate potential jurors. A prosecutor
is a "minister of justice" whose duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict.1 3
Unlike any other lawyer, a criminal prosecutor has an affirmative duty to the
opposing party.14 A criminal defense attorney has no reciprocal duty to the
government; she is charged exclusively with her client's well-being. 15
A prosecutor's goal should be a fair and constitutional conviction, not
conviction by any means, even if those means are sanctioned by the legislature.
The constitutional protections afforded to criminal defendants-such as the
privilege against self-incrimination, the presumption of innocence, the" stringent
beyond a reasonable doubt standard, and the requirement of a unanimous jury
verdict to convict-exist to counter the innate power imbalance that favors the
government. The asymmetrical relationship between the prosecution and defense
undercuts an argument for tactical parity with respect to peremptory challenges. 
16
Prosecutors should voluntarily abstain from using tools that are legal but risk
seating a biased jury and denying individuals of a certain class, race, or gender
the right to serve on juries.
These rationales do not apply to civil prosecutors. In addition to the fact that
the constitutional and policy protections of criminal defendants do not apply to
civil litigants,17 civil prosecutors often deal with corporate and other defendants
13. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2007) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]. See also STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, The Function of the Prosecution, Standard 3-1.2 (Am. Bar Ass'n 3d ed. 1992).
14. MODEL RULES R. 3.8. See also R. MICHAEL CASSIDY, PROSECUTORIAL ETfics 3 (2005).
15. Although an exercise of peremptory challenges by a government defense lawyer might qualify as
"arbitrary and capricious" if lacking rational basis, a discussion of the relative duties of defense counsel, both
constitutional and not, is beyond the scope of this Article. The arguments in favor of prosecutors voluntarily
waiving peremptory challenges weigh persuasively in favor of their elimination entirely.
16. In addition, because the purpose of the peremptory challenge is a back-up for the for-cause challenge and a
further guarantee of juror impartiality, it is noteworthy that only the defendant, and not the government, has a
constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury under the Sixth Amendment. See NANCY GERTNER & JUTrm H. MIZNR,
THE LAW OF JURIES § 3:3 at 61 nrl (2d ed. Thompson West 2009) [hereinafter THE LAW OF JURIES] ("[The government
has no constitutional right to an impartial jury but, clearly, there is a strong policy basis for insuring that the jury the
government receives is an impartial one as well." (citing Stephen R Diprima, Note, Selecting a Jury in Federal
Criminal Trials after Batson and McCollum, 95 CoLuM. L REv. 888, 891 n.25 (1995)).
17. The constitutional guarantees of the Sixth Amendment in criminal cases, for example, have been
extended to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment, whereas those of the Seventh Amendment affecting civil
litigants have not. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 218-20 (1965). This reflects the greater qualitative
[Vol. 23:369
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whose resources and stature more closely resemble those of the government
prosecutor.
The fact that the government's role in civil litigation, especially as a defendant,
can more closely mirror that of other civil litigants requires a different analysis of
a civil prosecutor's role across various types of civil litigation and exceeds the
scope of this paper. 18 While arguments might be made that, in some civil cases,
prosecutors should voluntarily limit their use of peremptory challenges, what is at
stake in criminal cases is sufficiently qualitatively distinct. This Article will focus
on the latter while remaining agnostic on its possible applicability to other
situations.
Public perception of the fairness and trustworthiness of the prosecutorial
process is critical to a healthy criminal justice system. 9 In exercising the power
of the government to prosecute criminal offenses, a prosecutor must balance
many competing interests: protecting the public, demanding accountability from
law breakers, obtaining psychological and financial redress for victims, deterring
future criminal behavior, and maintaining both the actual integrity of the
prosecutorial process as well as the public perception of process integrity. In an
individual case, a prosecutor who has analyzed the facts and the law and
concluded that a criminal defendant has committed a crime likely has conviction
as a goal. On a broader stage, the goal of a prosecutorial office is a higher
office-wide conviction rate across all such cases. Nonetheless, few, if any,
prosecutors would be willing to forfeit public confidence in the fairness of the
system in exchange for a higher criminal conviction rate. 20 The prosecutor's goal
should be fair and constitutional conviction, not conviction by any means, even if
those means are sanctioned by the legislature. After all, justice pursued at any
cost is rarely just.
Prosecutors are generally held to a different standard than attorneys represent-
ing clients.21 Unlike other lawyers, a prosecutor is charged not merely with a duty
concern for the rights of criminal defendants (where life or liberty hangs in the balance) than those of civil
litigants (where property rights are at stake).
18. In civil litigation, government prosecutors appear as defense counsel far more often than as plaintiff's
counsel. In the federal system, of all civil cases commenced in 2008 where the United States was a party, the
government was the plaintiff in 22% of cases and the defendant in 78%. Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts,
Statistical Tables for the Federal Judiciary, Table C-2 (2007-2008), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
stats/dec08/index.html.
19. As noted by Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826) in a letter to George Hammond in 1792, "It is reasonable that
everyone who asks justice should do justice." Letter from Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of State, to George
Hammond, British Prime Minister to the United States (May 29, 1792) in 7 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON at
34 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., Federal ed. 1904-05), available at http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/804/ 86391.
20. Sadly, several lawyers who read earlier drafts of this article heatedly disputed this proposition. Their
collective belief is that prosecutors on the whole seek to "win at any cost" with little regard for the actual or
perceived fairness of the system. This perception provides additional evidence why prosecutors should carefully
weigh the decision to exercise discretionary peremptory challenges. See infra Part III.
21. See, e.g., Kenneth Bresler, "I Never Lost a Trial": When Prosecutors Keep Score of Criminal
Convictions, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETmcs 537 (1996); Ross Galin, Above the Law: The Prosecutor's Duty to Seek
2010]
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to advocate for her client, but an ethical duty to "seek justice. ' 22 This constitutes
a unique ethical standard against which prosecutors' discretionary use of
peremptory challenges must be evaluated. Peremptory challenges are not
constitutionally guaranteed2 3; rather, they are a prophylactic safeguard of a
constitutional right to an impartial jury. Such safeguards are subject to
cost-benefit scrutiny2 4 prompting an assessment of the extent to which the
practice risks unconstitutional discrimination, damaging both the actual and
perceived fairness of the prosecution process, as well as the extent to which the
practice actually increases the likelihood of a just conviction. And in balancing
the two, is the benefit of one outweighed by the detriment to the other?
A prosecutor cannot deny that peremptory challenges may be exercised in an
improper discriminatory manner at least some of the time by some of the lawyers
in her office.25 In addition, prosecutors are sometimes unable to elicit adequate
information about prospective jurors to form rationally-based reasons for
excusing jurors peremptorily. This raises an entirely separate concern about the
unconstitutionality of a prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges as an
Justice and the Performance of SubstantialAssistance Agreements, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1245 (2000); Leslie C.
Griffin, The Prudent Prosecutor, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 259 (2001); Samuel J. Levine, Taking Prosecutorial
Ethics Seriously: A Consideration of the Prosecutor's Ethical Obligation to "Seek Justice" in a Comparative
Analytical Framework, 41 Hous. L. REV. 1337 (2004).
22. MODEL RuLEs R. 3.8 cmt. 1 ("A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply
that of an advocate."); STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARD 3-1.2
("The prosecutor is an administrator of justice."); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1998)
[hereinafter MODEL CODE].
23. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 57 (1992).
24. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657 (1984) (concluding that public safety may outweigh
need for a prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination, i.e.,
Miranda warnings). See generally David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV.
190 (1988).
25. I am speaking here of subconscious discrimination or "implicit bias" based on gender and racial
stereotypes in the absence of juror-specific information. As federal judge Mark Bennett explains, "Implicit
biases are the plethora of fears, feelings, perceptions, and stereotypes that lie deep within our
subconscious, without our conscious permission or acknowledgement. Indeed, social scientists are
convinced that we are, for the most part, unaware of them. As a result, we unconsciously act on such biases
even though we may consciously abhor them." Bennett, supra note 5, at 149. (Judge Bennett presents an
excellent review of the social science research regarding implicit bias, and concludes that peremptory
challenges should be eliminated entirely. In furtherance of his argument, the judge challenges all members
of the legal profession to visit www.implicit.harvard.edu and perform an implicit bias "Demonstration
Test.'!).
In addition to implicit bias, there exits the possibility that some prosecutors, despite good training and
supervision, will intentionally engage in discrimination. In the federal system alone, prosecutorial
misconduct of various forms, as documented by the U.S. Department of Justice's Office of Professional
Responsibility, has tripled during the last decade. See Jim McGee & Brian Duffy, Truth and Consequences:
How the Department of Justice Really Works, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 1, 1996, at 28. As noted by
one commentator, even "highly moral prosecutors, emotionally committed to the imperative of getting the
'bad guys' off the street might deem evading [ethical rules] a small price to pay to accomplish this goal."
Randall Grometstein, Prosecutorial and Noble-Cause Corruption, 43 No. 1 CRIM. L. BULL. 2 (2007).
[Vol. 23:369
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irrational, arbitrary,26 and capricious 27  governmental act.28 These risks of
perceived and actual misuse of peremptory challenges in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause should persuade a prosecutor to rethink her office policy on
the practice. The fact that the perceived value of peremptory challenges rests on
several assumptions of questionable validity should ultimately convince a
prosecutor that the costs of peremptory challenges in most situations outweigh
any benefit.
In this Article, I review the efficacy of peremptory challenges and conclude
that both empirical and anecdotal evidence confirm such challenges are of little
utility. I contend that the marginal benefit of peremptory challenges to a criminal
prosecutor is outweighed by the damage done to both the actual and perceived
fairness of the system. I argue for an office policy directing prosecutors to waive
peremptory challenges except in narrowly defined circumstances, such as curing
a failed challenge for cause by either party or excusing a juror who demonstrates
an unwillingness to deliberate in good faith.
I. ASSESSING THE VALUE OF THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
The starting point for assessing the net value of peremptory challenges to a
prosecutor is an evaluation of the usefulness of peremptory challenges. 29 The
perceived value of peremptory challenges rests on several assumptions of
questionable validity. To conclude that peremptory challenges are useful, one
must first assume that during the selection process lawyers can, and do, ask
questions and make observations that unearth information that effectively
informs them about the potential jurors' biases, attitudes, beliefs, and preconcep-
26. "Arbitrary" is defined as action done "in an 'arbitrary manner, as fixed or done capriciously or at
pleasure. Without adequate determining principle; not founded in the nature of things; nonrational; not done or
acting according to reason or judgment, depending on the will alone...". ' BLACK'S LAW DIcrONARY 96
(5th ed. 1979). See generally Solomon M. Fulero & Steven D. Penrod, Attorney Jury Selection Folklore: What
Do They Think and How Can Psychologists Help?, 3 FoRENsIc REP. 233, 241-43 (finding lawyers' decisions
during voir dire to be arbitrary by scientific standards); Valerie P Hans & Neil Vidmar, Jury Selection, in THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COuRTRooM 39, 73 (Norbert L. Kerr & Robert M. Bray eds., 1982) (finding lawyers'
assessment of prospective jurors to be arbitrary).
27. "'Capricious' adj. 1. (Of a person) characterized by or guided by unpredictable or impulsive behavior."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
28. See Note, Due Process Limits on Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenges, 102 HARv. L. REy. 1013 (1989)
(arguing that prosecutorial peremptory challenges, as potentially arbitrary and capricious government actions,
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
29. Within the scope of this Article, the discussion of the utility of peremptory challenges is limited to the
intended purpose of identifying and excusing prospective jurors whose attitudes and beliefs render them
incapable of sitting as an impartial and fair juror. Some scholars have noted that the exercise of peremptory
challenges, subjected to the scrutiny of a Batson inquiry, has a separate utility in terms of legal ethics. See, e.g.,
Laura I. Appleman, Reports of Batson 's Death Have Been Greatly Exaggerated: How the Batson Doctrine
Enforces a Normative Framework of Legal Ethics, 78 TEw. L. REV. 608 (2005) ('The Batson procedure
enforces a normative framework of legal ethics, providing an aspirational standard for the legal profession...
fostering a nondiscrimination norm as part of the norm of professionalization .... ").
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tions. Second, one must assume that a lawyer can perform an effective calculus
on the information obtained and assess, on the spot, the relative merits of these
experiences and biases. Based on this calculus, it must be further assumed that
the lawyer can accurately deselect those few jurors (frequently only three) who
would be the least amenable to-or the most biased against-the case, the client,
or the lawyer herself.
In appraising the value of the peremptory challenge, I first provide an overview
of the American jury selection system and discuss the intended purpose and role
of the peremptory challenge within it. Then, I briefly examine the history of the
peremptory challenge in England and the English valuation of the peremptory
challenge based on seven hundred years' experience. Last, I evaluate the ef-
fectiveness of the challenge, relying on both empirical studies and anecdotal
evidence from my own 20+ years of experience in the courtroom as a civil
litigator, a criminal prosecutor, and a judge.
The purpose of the jury selection system is to empanel a final, petit jury30
composed of impartial jurors free of bias or prejudice with respect to the parties
or issues in the case, selected without discrimination from a representational
cross-section of society. Peremptory challenges, exercised at the last stage of the
jury selection process, are supposed to provide an additional layer of nondiscrimi-
natory scrutiny to the proposed panel of jurors, further ensuring impartiality.3'
The goal of impartiality is driven by the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Con-
stitution, which guarantees criminal defendants the right to "an impartial jury of
the State and district where the crime shall have been committed.,
32
An impartial jury is considered critical to providing a fair trial to litigants in the
American justice system.3 3 In addition to a litigant's right to have his or her case
decided by ajury of individuals free of bias or prejudice, individual citizens enjoy
a separate right to be considered for jury service without the taint of improper
discrimination.34 The concept of a constitutionally sound jury as one that is
representational-that is, selected from a cross-sectional venire-is tied to
democratic principles associated with jury service in this country.35 For a petit
30. The petit jury is defined as the group of jurors ultimately impaneled to sit and decide the case.
31. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202,218-19 (1965).
32. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI. Although the Sixth Amendment concerns only criminal cases, the expectation of an
impartial jury has been extended to civil litigants under the Seventh Amendment. See Stephen R. Diprima, Note,
Selecting a Jury in Federal Criminal Trials after Batson and McCollum, 95 COLuM. L. REv. 888, 891 n.25 (1995).
33. See supra note 2. Juror impartiality is required throughout the proceedings, not just at the outset of the
trial. Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
34. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
35. See Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946) ("The American tradition of trial by jury...
necessarily contemplates an impartial jury drawn from a cross-section of the community. This does not mean, of
course, that every jury must contain representatives of all the economic, social, religious, racial, political, and
geographical groups of the community; frequently prospective jurors shall be selected by court officials without
systematic and intentional exclusion of any of these groups. Recognition must be given to the fact that those
eligible for jury service are to be found in every stratum of society. Jury competence is an individual rather than
[Vol. 23: 369
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jury to meet this latter constitutional threshold of impartiality, the selection
system employed must pass two tests. First, the methodology the court uses to
identify and summon citizens for jury duty (selection of the grand venire) must
be free of discrimination. Second, the method by which individual members of
a case-specific venire are included or excluded from service on the petit jury
must also be free of discrimination.36 The requirement that the larger venire from
which the petit jury is ultimately selected be impartial has been interpreted to
require a venire drawn from a fair cross-section of the community selected with-
out systematic exclusion of any group.37 In the federal system, there are also
additional statutory rights to a venire composed of a fair cross section of the
community.31
Jury selection procedures vary,39 but they generally consist of three stages:4 °
(1) identifying and summoning potential jurors to the courthouse for service4 1 ;
(2) selecting smaller groups of those summoned potential jurors for inclusion in
a case-specific venire; and (3) selecting from the case-specific venire those individuals
who ultimately serve on the petit jury in an individual case. Although challenges have
been raised to the first two stages of the system,42 the vast majority of criticism has been
a group or class matter. That fact lies at the very heart of the jury system. To disregard it is to open the door to
class distinctions and discriminations which are abhorrent to the democratic ideals of trial by jury.").
36. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530-31 (1975) (citing Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227
(1946)); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986); THE LAW OF JURIES, supra note 16, at 34-48.
37. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 367 (1979); Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530-31.
38. Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1878 (2006).
39. See, e.g., Gerald T. Wetherington, Hanson Lawton, & Donald I. Pollock, Preparing for the High Profile
Case: An Omnibus Treatment for Judges and Lawyers, 51 FLA. L. REV. 425 (1999).
40. In federal courts, the Jury Selection and Service Act (JSSA) requires each district to "devise and place
into operation a written" plan specifying how it will select jurors. 28 U.S.C. § 1863(a).
41. In federal courts, identifying and summoning potential jurors to the courthouse for service requires both
random identification of potential jurors and evaluation of those randomly selected jurors for disqualification,
exemption, or excuse from jury service. See JODY GEORGE, DEIRDRE GOLASH & RUSSELL WHEELER, HANDBOOK
ON JURY USE IN THE FEDERAL DIsTRIcr COURTS 24-28 (1989). The JSSA requires the jury selection plan specify
how a district is to create a master jury wheel from names randomly drawn from source lists. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1863(b)(3). Potential jurors on the master jury wheel are randomly selected to receive qualification
questionnaires which aid the court in identifying in advance those citizens who are either not required to serve or
are not qualified to serve as jurors. 28 U.S.C. § 1869(h). A judge reviews the completed questionnaires and
determines whether any potential jurors are "unqualified for, or exempt, or to be excused from jury service."
28 U.S.C. § 1865(a). The JSSA sets forth eight grounds for disqualifying a potential juror from service (U.S
citizenship, minimum age, residence in the district for at least one year, English literacy, mental and physical
soundness, and criminal record), and the court must disqualify an individual meeting any one of the eight
grounds, even if the individual wishes to serve. Some qualified jurors may nonetheless be statutorily exempt
from jury service if they are active members of the military, members of a fire or police department, or are a
"public officer." 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(6). As with an unqualified potential juror, an exempt potential juror may
not serve on a jury even if he or she wishes. Last, the JSSA provides that a court may excuse some potential
jurors based on individual requests. Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States, H.R. Doc.
No. 97-18, at 107 (1980).
42. See, e.g., Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530-31 (striking down exemption of women from jury pool); see also State
v. Lanciloti, 201 P.3d 323 (Wash. 2009) (challenging juror distribution in the grand venire).
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levied at the third stage of jury selection: voir dire.4 3
Voir dire is the final stage of jury selection when the members of a
case-specific venire are questioned about their ability to be a fair and impartial
juror. Voir dire procedures vary from state to state, between federal and state
courts, among judges within a court, and sometimes from case to case in one
judge's courtroom. The length of time allotted to questioning the venire is usually
left to the sound discretion of the judge and also varies widely from court to court.
The questioning may be conducted exclusively by the judge, exclusively by the
attorneys, or by both." The average time for questioning in felony criminal cases
43. See, e.g., Abraham Abramovsky, Juror Safety: The Presumption of Innocence and Meaningful Voir Dire
in Federal Criminal Proceedings-Are They An Endangered Species?, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 30 (1981-1982);
Albert Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of
Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153 (1989); Jose Felipe Anderson, Catch Me If You Can! Resolving The Ethical
Tragedies In the Brave New World of Jury Selection, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 343 (1998); Karen Bray, Reaching
the Final Chapter in the Story of Peremptory Challenges, 40 UCLA L. REV. 517 (1992); Raymond J. Broderick,
Why Peremptory Challenge Should Be Abolished, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 369 (1992); Carol A. Chase and Colleen P.
Graffey, A Challenge For Cause Against Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Proceedings, 19 LoY. L.A. INT'L
& Comp. L.. 507 (1997); Joseph A. Colquitt, Using Jury Questionnaires: (Ab)using Jurors, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1
(2007); James R. Gadwood, The Framework Comes Crumbling Down: JuryQuest in a Batson World, 88 B.U. L.
REV. 291 (2008); Reid Hastie, Is Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire an Effective Procedure for the Selection of
Impartial Juries?, 40 Am. U. L. REV. 703 (1991); Andrew D. Leipold, Constitutionalizing Jury Selection in
Criminal Cases: A Critical Evaluation, 86 GEO. L.J. 945 (1998); Nancy S. Marder, Beyond Gender: Peremptory
Challenges and the Roles of the Jury, 73 TEx. L. REV. 1041 (1995); Nancy S. Marder, Justice Stevens, the
Peremptory Challenge, and the Jury, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 1683 (2006); Jim McElhaney, Rejiggering Jury
Selection: Angus Argues for Giving Opening Statements Before Conducting Voir Dire, A.B.A. J., April 2008 at
30; Kenneth Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson and Peremptory Challenges,
71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447 (1996); Jean Montoya, The Future of the Post-Batson Peremptory Challenge: Voir
Dire by Questionnaire and the "Blind" Peremptory, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFoRM 981 (1996); Charles J. Ogletree,
Just Say No! A Proposal to Eliminate Racially Discriminatory Uses of Peremptory Challenges, 31 AM. CRim. L.
REV. 1099 (1994); Antony Page, Batson's Blind-Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremptory
Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155 (2005); Rachael A. Ream, Limited Voir Dire: Why It Fails to Detect Juror Bias,
CRIM. JUSTICE (Winter 2009); Andrew Weis, Peremptory Challenges: The Last Barrier to Jury Service for
People with Disabilities, 33 WILLAMETTrE L. REV. 1 (1997); Amy Wilson, The End of Peremptory Challenges: A
Call for Change Through Comparative Analysis, 32 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 363 (2009); Marvin
Zalman & Olga Tsoudis, Plucking Weeds from the Garden: Lawyers Speak About Voir Dire, 51 WAYNE L. REV.
163 (2005); NINTH CI. JURY TRIAL IMPROVEMENT Comm., SECOND REPORT: REcOMMENDATIONS AND SUGGESTED
BEST PRACTICES 8 (2006).
44. There is generally less attorney participation in voir dire in federal court. Bennett, supra note 5, at 159. In
federal court, wide discretion is given the trial judge on the method and scope of voir dire. "The Constitution,
after all, does not dictate a catechism for voir dire, but only that the defendant be afforded an impartial jury.
Even so, part of the guarantee of a defendant's right to an impartial jury is an adequate voir dire to identify
unqualified jurors." Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992). Rule 47 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure both authorize the court (a) to conduct the
examination of prospective jurors or b) to permit the parties to supplement it by such further inquiry as it deems
proper, or submit to the prospective jurors such additional questions of the parties or their attorneys as it deems
proper. In a 1994 Federal Judicial Center survey of federal judges, approximately 54% of judges reported they
allowed some questioning by attorneys in criminal cases: 29% conducted the initial questioning and then
allowed follow-up questioning by the attorneys, 18% allowed extensive time for follow-up questioning by the
attorneys, and approximately 7% allowed counsel to conduct most or all of the voir dire. JOHN SHAPARD &
MoLLY TREADWAY JOHNSON, FED. JUDICIAL CTrP, MEMORANDUM TO THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, AND
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has been reported as 3.6 hours in federal courts and 3.8 hours in state courts.4 5
While some studies find these average times consistent whether the questioning
is conducted by the lawyers, the judge, or both,"6 others conclude that judges are
more efficient.47
A. CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE
The purpose of questioning prospective jurors is to enable the lawyers to make
informed decisions when exercising for-cause and peremptory challenges.48 At
the conclusion of the questioning phase, an attorney may ask the court to excuse a
potential juror "for cause" where the attorney believes the juror has demonstrated
an inability to serve impartially in the case.4 9 These challenges for cause have
been held to be constitutionally guaranteed to a criminal defendant as the primary
method by which the court endeavors to seat an impartial jury in satisfaction of
the Sixth Amendment. ° The number of for-cause challenges is unlimited in both
state and federal courts.5 '
In exercising a for-cause challenge, an attorney must identify a specific basis
THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL RULES OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES (1994),
available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsfllookup/0022.pdf/$file/0022.pdf. Another survey of 450 federal
judges revealed that in almost 67% of federal courts, the judge alone conducts all the questioning during voir
dire. KEVIN F. O'MALLEY, JAY E. GRENIO & HON. WILLIAM C. LEE, 1 FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND
INSTRUCTIONS: JURY TRIAL § 4:7 n. 8, at 184-85 (6th ed. 2006) (citing J. Stratton Shartel, Federal Judges Employ
Wide Variety of Jury Procedures 8 No. 8 INSIDE LmG. 1, 15-17 (1994)). For this reason, judge-conducted voir
dire is sometimes referred to as "the federal method." See V. HALE START & MARK MCCORMICK, JURY SELECTION
§ 9.01, at 273 (3rd ed. 2001). In state courts, voir dire questioning is conducted by both the judges and the
attorneys in 43 states. Valerie P. Hans & Alayna Jehle, Avoid Bald Men and People with Green Socks? Other
Ways to Improve the Voir Dire Process in Jury Selection, 78 Cmi.-KENT L. REv. 1179, 1184 (2003). In six states,
only judges conduct the questioning. Id. In some of those states, judges permit some attorney questions. Id.
Questioning is conducted only by attorneys in four states, as well as in New York in civil trials. Id.
45. VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 2, at 89.
46. Scott W. Howe, Juror Neutrality or an Impartiality Array? A Structural Theory of the Impartial Jury
Mandate, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1173, 1185 (1995).
47. See, e.g., Susan E. Jones, Judge- Versus Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire: An Empirical Investigation of
Juror Candor, 11 LAW & Hum. BEHAV. 131 (1987); David Suggs & Bruce D. Sales, Juror Self-Disclosure in the
Voir Dire: A Social Science Analysis, 56 IND. L.J. 245, 251-52 (1981). See also M.A. Costantino, Abolish
Lawyers' Voir Dire of Juries, 8(3) LING. 5 (1982) (surveying 420 district courts and finding that
judge-conducted voir dire lasted less than one hour in 65% of criminal cases).
48. See V. HALE START & MARK MCCORMICK, JURY SELECTION § 8.01, at 237 (3rd ed. 2001). A few states
employ a struck jury system instead of exercising peremptory challenges. Under this system, the attorneys take
turns "striking" jurors until the statutorily prescribed number ofjurors remain. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-16-100
(2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-359 (2009).
49. An attorney exercising a "for cause" challenge must build a record to satisfy the judge that the juror is
unable to be an unbiased fact finder, either because the juror is likely to decide the case on personal bias, would
likely ignore relevant arguments of counsel, or would be improperly influenced by extrajudicial information
regarding the case, such as media coverage. See Howe, supra note 46, at 1183.
50. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 91 (1986); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965).
51. Although only a criminal defendant has a constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury, jury composition
is viewed as a fairness issue for other parties, raising due process considerations. Consequently, all litigants, in
civil and criminal trials, have an unlimited number of for-cause challenges available to them.
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52for the challenge and the judge then rules on the validity of the reason given.
Most states have narrowly drawn statutes that delineate specific grounds for such
challenges, usually failure to meet statutory qualifications, actual bias, or implied
bias.53 Although narrow state statutes may provide additional grounds for such
challenges, the threshold analysis of a for-cause challenge is governed by the Sixth
Amendment, which "prescribes no specific tests" for determining impartiality.
54
A for-cause challenge must be based on specific, demonstrable, and legally
cognizable evidence of juror partiality.55 A juror's own admission of bias is
sufficient evidence of partiality supporting a for-cause challenge. 56 Life experi-
ences, associations, or attitudes can also provide sufficiently specific evidence of
partiality warranting a for-cause challenge. Even after such partiality is demon-
strated, however, a judge need not excuse a juror challenged for cause as long as
the juror promises to put aside any biases.57 A judge has broad discretion in
assessing whether a juror can, in fact, be fair, and different judges may come to
different conclusions based on the same information.59
B. PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
The narrow definition and application of for-cause challenges may limit their
effectiveness in ensuring an impartial jury.6° For this reason, each party also has a
52. Examples of specific reasons justifying a for-cause challenge include conflict of interest, potential bias,
or lack of candor. The Supreme Court has stated in the context of a capital case that a trial judge should not
excuse a potential juror for cause unless the juror's views will "prevent or substantially impair the performance
of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath." Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 423
(1985) (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980)).
53. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 270.20 (McKinney 1995). There is no corresponding federal statutory
enumeration. Rather, the Sixth Amendment governs the standard for such a challenge.
54. United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 133 (1936). "Impartiality is not a technical conception. It is a state
of mind. For the ascertainment of the mental attitude of appropriate indifference, the Constitution lays down no
particular tests and procedure is not chained to any ancient and artificial formula." Id. at 145-46.
55. There are three types of partiality, or bias: actual bias, implied bias, and inferred bias. See United States v.
Torres, 128 F.3d 38, 43-47 (2d Cir. 1997) ("Actual bias [is established when] the juror admits partiality....
Implied or presumed bias is 'bias conclusively presumed as a matter of law' [when it] is attributed to a
prospective juror regardless of actual partiality [when a juror meets the statutory criteria for automatic challenge
for cause and is legislatively disqualified, such as the juror being related to one of the parties]. Disqualification
on the basis of implied bias is mandatory .... On the contrary, there exist a few circumstances that involve no
showing of actual bias, and that fall outside of the implied bias category, where a court may, nevertheless,
properly decide to excuse a juror. We call this third category 'inferrable bias'.... Bias may be inferred when a
juror discloses a fact that bespeaks a risk of partiality sufficiently significant to warrant granting the trial judge
discretion to excuse the juror for cause, but not so great as to make mandatory a presumption of bias .... ).
56. Theoretically, a judge could refuse to believe a juror's admission of bias, such as when the judge believes
the admission is pretextual to avoid jury duty.
57. See Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415 (1991).
58. Christopher A. Cosper, Rehabilitation of the Juror Rehabilitation Doctrine, 37 GA. L. REv. 1471 (2003).
59. See, e.g., Uttecht v. Brown, 127 S. Ct. 2218 (2007) (five members of the Court found that the trial judge
did not err in dismissing a juror for cause, while four justices dissented, concluding the opposite).
60. See Mary R. Rose & Shari Seidman Diamond, Judging Bias:Juror Confidence and Judicial Rulings on
Challenges for Cause, 42 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 513, 514-15 (2008) (citing studies suggesting that judges tend to
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limited number of peremptory challenges, 6' where an attorney may excuse a
juror without a stated reason, and without leave of the court, as long as the basis
for the decision is not discriminatory.62 The number of peremptory challenges
varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In non-capital felony cases, the number of
peremptory challenges ranges from three to twenty.63 In several states and in the
federal system, the defense is allotted more peremptory challenges than the
prosecution. 64
Prospective jurors are most typically questioned collectively in open court in a
case-specific venire rather than individually.65 In some Cases, especially those
with intense media coverage or involving sensitive issues such as sexual abuse or
extreme violence, prospective jurors may have filled out case-specific jury
questionnaires prior to voir dire in order to assist the attorneys in this process.66
The number of potential jurors assigned to a case-specific venire and the total
time spent on voir dire varies from court to court.6 7 The number of potential
jurors dispatched as a venire to a courtroom for a particular case is usually larger
when the court anticipates a high number of challenges for cause (due to pretrial
media coverage, for example) or when the trial is expected to be particularly
lengthy. 68 In a longer trial, the court will usually seat one or two alternate jurors,
accept at face value jurors' claims of impartiality even when jurors' experiences pose "substantial threats to their
abilities to be impartial." This is so even though research demonstrates that juror self-assessment of fairness is
not reliable.).
61. In criminal cases in state courts, the defense may be afforded a greater number of peremptory challenges.
See, e.g., JURY TRIAL INNOVATIONS (G. Thomas Munsterman, Paula L. Hannaford-Agor & G. Marc Whitehead
eds., 2d ed. 2006) [hereinafter JURY TRIAL].
62. See citations and accompanying text, supra note 4.
63. See, e.g., JURY TRIAl, supra note 61.
64. See Jon M. Van Dyke, Jury Selection Procedures: Our Uncertain Commitment to Representative Panels
app. D (1977).
65. In death penalty cases, a court may employ both methods, questioning potential jurors in two phases, first
as a group and then individually outside the presence of the other potential jurors. See, e.g., David C. Baldus,
George Woodworth, David Zuckerman, Neil Alan Weiner & Barbara Broffitt, The Use of Peremptory
Challenges in Capital Murder Trials: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 3 (2001).
66. Jury questionnaires are commonly used in two ways: a preliminary questionnaire to determine threshold
eligibility for service and a more detailed, case-specific questionnaire to assist the court and lawyers to prepare
and conduct voir dire. The "qualifications questionnaire" is often sent out with the summons for jury duty. It
requests basic data that allows the court to determine if the juror meets the minimum qualifications for service.
67. See J. Clark Kelso, Final Report of the Blue Ribbon Commission on Jury System Improvement, 47
HASTINGS L.J. 1481 (July-August 1996); Zalman & Tsoudis, Plucking Weeds from the Garden: Lawyers Speak
About Voir Dire, 51 WAYNE L. REv. 163, 274-83 (Spring 2005). Courts attempt to estimate the number ofjurors
needed with some precision, so as not to waste citizens' time when reporting for jury duty. In the federal system,
the national goal is to limit to thirty percent the number of jurors de-selected for service. DI. OF THE ADMiN.
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
88 (Sept. 1984). Many state courts have a one-day/one-jury trial system, whereby jurors serve for only one day
unless they are seated on a trial. J. Stratton Shartel, Large States Should Implement One-Day/One-Trial Jury
Systems, 7 No. 9 INSIDE LImG. 2 (Sept. 1993).
68. See 1 JuRYwORK SYSTEMAnc TRCHNIQUES § 7:37 NATIONAL JURY PRoJEcr DATABASE (Nov. 2009). In
addition to the length of the trial and media coverage, more mundane factors may be considered in estimating
the number of jurors needed, including the road conditions affecting juror travel and the number of absent, ill,
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triggering additional peremptory challenges for each party.69 A longer trial will
likely inconvenience more prospective jurors such that there will be more juror
hardship requests to be excused from jury duty.70 On balance, for a non-death
penalty criminal felony case, a common venire size in federal court is upwards of
thirty prospective jurors, depending on the anticipated need.71
While most scholars and judges agree that questioning prospective jurors
during voir dire is indispensible to a fair trial, 72 there is a general acknowledge-
ment that the current system is flawed. Criticism is wide-ranging, and includes:
(1) unnecessary increase in cost of litigation, including attorneys' fees and jury
consultant costs 7 3 ; (2) frustration with some judges' narrow construction of "for
cause," which forces attorneys to exercise peremptory challenges against those
potential jurors whose answers have indicated a likelihood of partiality with
respect to some aspect of the case 74 ; (3) tension between the legitimate purpose
of voir dire (insuring an impartial jury) and some lawyers' goals to indoctrinate
and pre-persuade the jury to the themes and theory of their case (trying to obtain,
and visiting judges. See, e.g., KEVIN F. O'MALLEY, JAY E. GRENIG & HON. WILLIAM C. LEE, FEDERAL JURY
PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS (6th ed. 2006) (citing JODY GEORGE, DEIRDRE GOLASH & RUSSELL WHEELER,
HANDBOOK ON JURY USE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS, 1989 WL 270241, at *20 (1989)); see also Zalman & Tsoudis,
Plucking Weeds from the Garden: Lawyers Speak About Voir Dire, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 163, 275 (Spring 2005)
(finding that increased media coverage lengthens voir dire).
69. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(c) (providing for additional peremptory challenges where the court allows
alternate jurors); 2 FRED LANE, GOLDSTEIN TRIAL TECHNIQUE § 9:22 (3) (3d ed. 2007) (stating, as part of a
description of how some states deal with alternate jurors, that [i]f alternate jurors are called each side shall be
allowed one additional peremptory challenge, regardless of the number of alternate jurors called; HARRY
LEVINE, LEVINE ON TRIAL ADVOCACY, Jury Selection Ch. 2-A; Practising Law Institute PLI Order No. 18315,
217 PLI/Crim 59, Ninth Annual Municipal Law Institute JURY SELECTION Edward L. Birnbaum Carl T. Grasso
Herzfeld & Rubin, P.C. Hon. Ariel Belen Supreme Court, State of New York, Ch. 20, §20.10 (July 22,2009).
70. See Joanna Sobol, Note, Hardship Excuses and Occupational Exemptions: The Impairment of the "Fair
Cross-Section of the Community," 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 155, 168-73 (1995) (noting that longer trials may cause
hardship for many more prospective jurors, prompting requests to be excused from service).
71. In California, the number of jurors summoned for an ordinary felony case is forty-two. J. Clark Kelso,
Final Report of the Blue Ribbon Commission on Jury System Improvement, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1481 (July-August
1996). The number of citizens summoned for possible jury service on the two trials arising out of the Oklahoma
City federal building bombing case was 351 (McVeigh) and 400 (Nichols). A New Bombing Trial For McVeigh,
NAT'L L.J., July 28, 1997, at A6, in KEVIN F. O'MALLEY, JAY E. GRENIG & HON. WILLIAM C. LEE, FEDERAL JURY
PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS (6th ed. 2006).
72. See, e.g., Gregory E. Mize, On Better Jury Selection: Spotting UFO Jurors before They Enter the Jury
Room, CT. REv., Spring 1999, at 10 (taking as accepted the use of general, open-court questioning ofjurors, and
discussing the value of individual questioning of venire panel members).
73. See, e.g., Carol A. Chase and Colleen P. Graffey, A Challenge For Cause Against Peremptory Challenges
in Criminal Proceedings, 19 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. J. 507, 519-520 (1997).
74. Defenders and critics of peremptory challenges generally agree that challenges for cause are both
defined and applied unrealistically narrowly. Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have
Learned About Batson and Peremptory Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 486 (1996) (citing
Stephen A. Saltzburg & Mary Ellen Powers, Peremptory Challenges and the Clash between Impartiality
and Group Representation, 41 MD. L. REv. 337, 355 (1982); Frederick L. Brown et al., The Peremptory
Challenge as a Manipulative Device in Criminal Trials: Traditional Use or Abuse, 14 NEw ENG. L. REV.
192, 235 n. 244 (1978); Roger S. Kuhn, Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 235, 243
(1968)).
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in fact, a jury biased in favor of their case)75 ; (4) truncation of the time allowed
for questioning during voir dire 76 (often as a result of a judge's reaction to
lawyers' misuse of the time allotted for questioning); (5) recognition that most
attorneys are very poor at crafting questions on voir dire to elicit the information
needed to adequately evaluate the prospective jurors, making the exercise
unlikely to further the goal of seating an impartial jury7 7 ; (6) damage to public
perception of the justice system 78; and (7) realization that many peremptory
challenges are likely to be based on discriminatory beliefs, however subcon-
scious, and thus are unconstitutional.79
The various points of criticism can be summed up as skepticism about how
much attorneys can learn in less than four hours about the experiences, attitudes,
beliefs, preconceptions, biases, and prejudices of seventy-five or more dif-
ferent individuals across a number of complex issues that may be highly
sensitive, such as those involving racial bias. This skepticism is further magnified
by the additional expectation that the attorneys be able to analyze the interplay of
these attitudes and beliefs and identify which few prospective jurors are the most
likely to harbor negative biases or prejudices against their client, their case issues,
or themselves as attorneys. In addition to a collective skepticism that this
endeavor can be done well, there is widespread disbelief that, with respect to the
exercise of peremptory challenges, it can be done constitutionally without
discrimination.
75. A 1973 Dallas County prosecutor manual advised:
You are not looking for a fair juror, but rather a strong, biased and sometimes hypocritical individual
who believes the Defendants are different from them in kind, rather than degree; you are not looking
for any member of a minority group which may subject him to oppression-they almost always
empathise [sic] with the accused.
PAULA DIPERNA, JURIES ON TRIAL: FACES OF AMERICAN JUSTICE 154 (1981). About voir dire, Gerry Spence has
written: "The professed purpose of the exercise is to determine whether the juror can be fair and impartial. In
truth, the lawyers on both sides are looking for jurors who will decide the case for them." GERRY SPENCE, WIN
YOUR CASE: How TO PRESENT, PERSUADE, AND PREVAIL-EVERY PLACE, EVERY TIME 13 (2005).
76. Research confirms what common sense suggests: the shorter the time allocated to questioning the jury
during voir dire, the less information can be gathered by the attorneys, making them less able to effectively (and
constitutionally) exercise peremptory challenges. Rachel A. Ream, Limited Voir Dire: Why It Fails to Detect
Juror Bias, CRIM. JUST., Winter 2009, at 22; see also Clarke, Voir Dire and Jury Selection, in IA CRIMINAL
DEFENSE TECHNIQUES § 21.08, at 21-58 (rev. perm. ed. 1980) (noting the trend among judges to restrict voir dire
such that it becomes a "perfunctory process which fails completely in attaining its objectives" (footnote
omitted)); THE LAW OF JURIES, supra note 16, at 60 ("The overwhelming trend in recent years is to make this
part of jury selection quicker, and as a consequence, increasingly superficial and perfunctory."). See also NEn.
ViDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDicr 91-91 (2007) (citing empirical studies suggesting
that limited time for voir dire is ineffective).
77. See, e.g., NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, JURYWORK: SYSTEMIC TECHNIQUES § 9.01, at 9-2 (2d ed. 1985).
78. See, e.g., Reid Hastie, Is Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire an Effective Procedure of the Selection of
Impartial Juries?, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 725 (1991).
79. See, e.g., Gurney, supra note 5.
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1. THE ENGLISH EXPERIENCE WITH PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
The practice of peremptory challenges in the United States grew out of the
English common law system, debuting in England 80 between the years 1250 and
1300, and ending in 1989. As is true in the United States,81 the number of
peremptory challenges was determined legislatively. Over the centuries the
system was in use, the allotted number of challenges per side waxed and waned
based on the prevailing policies of the government, with prosecutors losing the
peremptory challenge in 1825.82 In the two decades before its demise, the system
of peremptory challenges was debated ever more heatedly, until Parliament
ultimately abolished the practice in 1989. As noted by two commentators on the
evolution and abolition of the peremptory challenge in England:
The fears and concerns expressed during the debate surrounding the abolition
of the peremptory challenge never came to fruition. Challenges for cause did
not increase, jurors did not suffer embarrassment due to challenges for cause,
and defendants were not robbed of a sense of justice. Barristers adjusted, and
many were surprised to discover that their long-held perception of the perfect
jury composition was wrong. 83
The detailed history of the rise and fall of the peremptory challenge in England
has been handily documented by several commentators.84 The unavoidable core
lesson of the history of the English system of peremptory challenges is that the
British lived with the system for over seven hundred years and, having failed at
modifying it into something worth saving, they abandoned the system in toto.
85
That the practice was discontinued two decades ago with no ill effects is
80. An earlier incarnation of the peremptory challenge was used in Rome. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,
119-20 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (tracing the history of peremptory challenges to the Romans in 104
B.C.).
81. Although the threshold number of peremptory challenges is established legislatively, a judge may grant
additional peremptories under local court rule or within the broad discretionary powers of the court to manage
litigation.
82. Juries Act, 1825, 6 Geo. 4, c. 50, § 29 (Eng.); Criminal Justice Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 4, c. 58, § 83,
sched. 10, part I (Eng.); Courts Act 1971, c. 23, § 40(7), sched. 4, 3(2) (repealed); Juries Act 1974, c. 23,
§ 12(5).
83. Carol A. Chase & Colleen P. Graffy, A Challenge For Cause Against Peremptory Challenges in Criminal
Proceedings, 19 Loy. L.A. INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 507, 535 (1997).
84. See id.
85. The British have rarely been accused of being knee-jerk reactionists or trend-setters. As noted social
historian Raymond Postgate (1896-1971) observed:
Deploring change is the unchangeable habit of all Englishmen. If you find any important figures who
really like change, such as Bernard Shaw, Keir Hardie, Lloyd George, Selfridge or Disraeli, you will
find that they are not really English at all, but Irish, Scotch, Welsh, American or Jewish. Englishmen
make changes, sometimes great changes. But, secretly or openly, they always deplore them.
Famousquotesandauthors.com, Unchangeable Quotes, http://www.famousquotesandauthors.com/keywords/
unchangeable-quotes.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2010).
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86instructive for would-be reformers of the American system.
2. PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES DEPEND ON LAWYERS' ABILITY TO GET INFORMATION
The utility of peremptory challenges depends on a lawyer's ability to
effectively gather and analyze information from prospective jurors. This ability is
influenced by several factors, including: 1) a lawyer's ability to craft information-
eliciting questions; 2) candor by potential jurors in responding to questions;
3) adequate time to collect enough juror data; and 4) a lawyer's ability to analyze
the data gathered. Although I have listed them in the order they come into play
during voir dire, the factors are interdependent such that discussion of one
frequently necessitates consideration of another. A lawyer cannot control all these
factors, and if any one of the factors is weak or missing, the results can be
disastrous. The following account of an actual jury selection gone awry is
illustrative and provides a contextual background for more detailed discussion.
i. A Cautionary Tale of Jury Selection Gone Wrong
In the summer of 1986, consumers nationwide were afraid someone was
tampering with their over-the-counter medicines, with deadly results. Four years
earlier, seven people had been killed in the Chicago area when they ingested
Tylenol capsules that had been laced with cyanide and placed on drugstore
shelves for unsuspecting shoppers to purchase.87 On the heels of the Chicago
Tylenol murders, reports of product-tampering and attendant consumer fear
skyrocketed around the country. In 1982 alone, the FDA documented 270 cases
of suspected product tampering. 88 In February 1986, a New York woman was
murdered under circumstances remarkably similar to the 1982 Chicago Tylenol
deaths when she died within minutes of swallowing two cyanide-laced Extra-
Strength Tylenol capsules from an allegedly tamper-proof sealed bottle.89 In
March 1986, just one month after the New York Tylenol murder, tampering
86. Having inherited the system from England, a quick look at the English experience is instructive, although
the purpose, utility, and effects of the peremptory challenge system in the United States must still be evaluated
against the backdrop of the U.S. Constitution and the sociological idiosyncrasies of the American people. A
parallel in literature was noted by the American poet Wallace Stevens (1875-1955) when he wrote "Nothing
could be more inappropriate to American literature than its English source since the Americans are not British
in sensibility." Thinkexist.com, Wallace Stevens Quotes, http://thinkexist.com/quotation/nothing-could be_
morejinappropriatejto american/298568.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2009).
87. The Chicago Tylenol case remains unsolved. A $100,000 reward, posted by Johnson & Johnson for the
capture and conviction of the "Tylenol Killer," has never been claimed. JoiN DouGLAS, THE ANATOMY OF
MOTIVE: Tim FBI's LEGENDARY MINDHUNTER EXPLORES THE KEY TO UNDERS'rANDiNG AND CATCHING VsOLEinrr
CRIMINALS 103-04 (Scribner 1999).
88. George J. Church, Lee Griggs, & Rita Healy, Copycats Are on the Prowl, TaME, Nov. 8, 1982, available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,925827,00. html.
89. Melinda Beck & Susan Agrest, Again, A Tylenol Killer, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 24, 1986, at 25.
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complaints nationwide again significantly increased,90 alarming consumers and
catching the murderous imagination of would-be copycat killers.
In June of 1986, Stella Nickell duplicated this deadly product-tampering
scheme in the Seattle area by lacing Excedrin capsules with cyanide in a
successful attempt to kill her husband, Bruce. She also killed another unsuspect-
ing Excedrin user hoping to obscure her connection to her husband's death by
creating the illusion of a larger, random product-tampering plan.9' Bruce
Nickell's death was initially attributed to natural causes, but six days after the
other death and one day after a highly-publicized massive product recall,92 Ms.
Nickell told police she suspected her husband had also been poisoned. 93
Investigators confirmed that he had been poisoned by cyanide and recovered two
tainted Excedrin bottles from the Nickells' home. Initially, they believed that the
drugs were likely taken from area stores, filled with cyanide, and then returned to
the stores. The FBI and Washington law enforcement agencies began a joint
effort to find the murderer and prevent further deaths.94 Media coverage of the
deaths, the medicine recall, and the investigation was comprehensive.
This was the backdrop for a smaller drama that played out in Seattle on July 31,
198695 involving a real estate agent, a package of crackers, and an ibuprofen pill.
The agent, Laurel Holliday, was holding an open house and went into the
homeowner's cupboards for a snack. There she found an open, half-eaten
package of Pepperidge Farm Goldfish crackers. As she nibbled on the crackers,
she realized she had bitten into and swallowed half of an orange-coated pill.
80. Park Dietz, Product Tampering, Foundation for American Communications, Apr. 23, 1999, revised Feb.
14, 2000, http://www.facsnet.org/index.php?option=com_ content&view=article&id = 193:product-tampering
02-00&catid=75:archives&Itemid = 100003.
91. Rachael Bell, The Tylenol Terrorist: Death in a Bottle, TRuTV.coM, http://www.trutv.com/library/crime/
terrorists.spies/terrorists/tylenolmurders/index.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2010).
92. In response, the manufacturer of the drug, Bristol-Myers, nationally recalled the product hoping to avert
any more deaths. Two of the recalled bottles also contained cyanide. Id. See also GREGG OLSEN, BiTER
ALMoNDs: THE TRUE STORY OF MOTHERS, DAUGHTERS, AND THE SEATTLE CYANIDE MURDERS 45 (2006).
93. Although Stella Nickell told responding paramedics as many as six times that her husband had taken
some Excedrin capsules "just before he fell," the preliminary cause of death was attributed to emphysema.
GREGG OLSEN, Br-TER ALMoNDs: THE TRUE STORY OF MOTHERS, DAUGHTERS, AND THE SEATTLE CYANIDE
MURDERS 4, 49 (St. Martin's Paperbacks 2006). Almost two weeks after the death, Ms. Nickell telephoned the
police, saying her husband had recently died and she had discovered some Excedrin pills that matched the lot
number of the cyanide-tainted recalled pills. Id. One might wonder why, after successfully killing her husband
and having the death found to be of natural causes, Ms. Nickell would alert the police to the fact he had been
poisoned. Id at 49. The reason was insurance: a death from natural causes would produce a payout of
approximately $80,000 whereas an accidental death fetched an additional $100,000. Id at 238, 257. Ms. Nickell
patiently waited until after receiving an amended death certificate before filing her insurance claim. Id at 238.
94. Tragically, the murderous plan was copied yet again in the Seattle area in 1991 by Joseph Earl Meling in
an unsuccessful attempt to kill his wife. Three people were poisoned and two of them died after ingesting
Sudafed capsules laced with cyanide by Mr. Meling. United States v. Meling, 47 F.3d 1546, 1558 (9th Cir.
1995).
95. Nickell's Lawyer Moves for Mistrial, SPOKESMAN-REv., May 21, 1988, at C7; Retrial Denied in Stella
Nickell Poisoning Case, SEATL TimEs, Aug. 29, 1989, at D2; Stella Nickell Loses Appeal in Cyanide Case,
SEATTLE TimES, Aug. 30, 1989, at D2.
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Given the recent highly-publicized deaths from poisoned pills within the greater
Seattle area, the agent was terrified. Had she just become the most recent victim
of a mass murderer? She called Poison Control and followed instructions to
purchase and drink syrup of ipecac, which quickly caused her to violently expel
the suspect pill. The half-noningested pill was later analyzed and confirmed to be
non-poisonous ibuprofen. Nonetheless, Ms. Holliday sued the cracker manufac-
turer, seeking damages based in part on the emotional distress she experienced
because of the recent Nickell murders.96 I represented the defendant, Pepperidge
Farm. During the course of the case, I proved that the pill could not have left the
manufacturer in the pristine condition that the agent stumbled upon it, due to the
particular production process at the manufacturing plant. Instead, the pill likely
came to rest in the open package of crackers during the course of the
homeowner's busy family life. The case ultimately settled in 1988 for $500.
Imagine my shock a few months after the settlement when I discovered that the
cracker-eating real estate agent had been seated as a juror when Stella Nickell
was finally brought to trial in federal court for fatal product tampering.9 7 How did
this woman, a recent plaintiff in a product-tampering personal injury lawsuit, get
seated on the jury of the very same case that formed the basis of her mental
distress claim?98 I found it impossible to believe the lawyers had not asked about
product tampering during jury selection, and I was skeptical that she would have
been seated if she had relayed her experience. I consulted with another lawyer at
my firm and we contacted the trial judge. 99 We learned that Ms. Holliday had
indeed been asked during voir dire whether she had any experience with product
tampering, but did not report the cracker incident or the lawsuit she filed. 00
96. Complaint, Holliday v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc.. (K.C.S.C. 1987) (No. 87-2-10810-4).
97. Ms. Holliday's service on the jury became the subject of news coverage when, four days into jury
deliberation, she reported to the court that she had received an anonymous telephone call reporting that the
defendant Stella Nickell had failed an FBI lie detector test. Stella Nickell Asks for New Trial; Juror's Conduct a
Key to Appeal, SEATrLE TIES, Jan. 10, 1989, at D12. At the time of the anonymous call, Ms. Holliday was the
holdout juror in a four-day long 11-1 deadlock. After the phone call, she changed her vote on the fifth day and
Ms. Nickell was convicted on five counts of product tampering. Nickell's Lawyer Moves for Mistrial,
SPOKcESMAN-REv., May 21, 1988 at C7. She told the judge about the call before continuing as ajuror, but said she
could disregard the information and deliberate fairly and the judge allowed her to remain on the jury. The
post-trial motion with the issue of possible juror tampering was reported in the newspapers, and it alerted me
that Ms. Holliday had been seated on the jury.
98. In her 1987 deposition, Ms. Holliday said, "I pretty much figured I was dead" after biting into the cracker.
United States v. Nickell, 883 F.2d 824, 826 (9th Cir. 1989). She went on to explain that "[t]his was right after the
cyanide poisonings in Auburn," the same poisonings involved in the Nickell case, and caused "a real paranoia
that I'd never had before about eating packaged products." Id. In addition to paranoia, she said in her deposition
that the event caused her trauma and anxiety. Id.
99. The court was also notified by a newspaper reporter whose research about the juror in connection with
the anonymous telephone call revealed that she had recently settled her own product contamination lawsuit..
100. During voir dire, Ms. Holliday was asked by the court: "Have you yourself, by chance, or anyone you
know, been the victim of a product tampering incident?" and she responded, "No." Nickell, 883 F.2d at 826. She
also said that there was nothing in her life experience that would affect her ability to be an impartial juror. Id.
This despite the fact that the day before being seated on the jury, Ms. Holliday had discussed with Seattle Times
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When questioned about this discrepancy by the judge, she maintained that she
had answered the questions put to her truthfully and fully. Ms. Holliday insisted
that she did not, in fact, have any experience with "product tampering" because I
had proven to her during the course of the lawsuit that no one had tampered with
the crackers!
This anecdotal account is but one illustration of the unpredictability of jury
selection. Studies suggest that, with respect to juror candor, the vast majority of
jurors take seriously the oath to answer questions truthfully, although there are
those jurors who under--or over-report hoping to be dismissed or seated on a
jury.1O' Many potential jurors thus manage to do what few civil litigants can
accomplish in deposition: they construe the questions narrowly, literally, and they
answer the question and only the question asked. Even the most honest, forthright
juror can unintentionally give misleading answers on voir dire as a result of
shyness, embarrassment, eagerness to please, inaccurate or incomplete memory,
inattention, misunderstanding of the concept being discussed, or use of alterna-
tive definitions.
ii. Obstacles to Eliciting Information from Prospective Jurors
Ideally, the judge and the attorneys would be able to gather all relevant
information needed from potential jurors during voir dire in order for the judge to
competently (and constitutionally 0 2 ) rule on challenges for cause and for the
attorneys to effectively (and nondiscriminatorily 1°3 ) exercise peremptory chal-
lenges. This ideal, however, presupposes adequate time allotted for questioning
of potential jurors, skill by judges and lawyers in crafting voir dire questions,
candor by jurors in responding, and a common lexicon with shared definitional
terms. If any one of these prerequisites is lacking, the exercise becomes flawed,
producing incomplete information. If more than one of these foundational
elements is missing, the information elicited may actually be affirmatively
misleading. The faulty voir dire not only fails to further the goal of empanelling
an impartial jury, but also thwarts it.
At least two of the required conditions for effective voir dire questioning (and
thus effective exercise of challenges) are missing in the majority of trials:
adequate time for questioning and adequately-constructed questions. The time
newspaper reporter Kristen Jackson the possibility of writing an article about her jury experiences and her
concern about whether the Pepperidge Farm case would come up during jury selection. OLSEN, supra note 92, at
535-36 (2006).
101. Broeder's research found that some jurors deliberately hid or distorted information during voir dire.
Dale W. Broeder, Voir Dire Examinations: An Empirical Study, 38 S. CAL. L. REv. 503, 513 (1965).
102. The judge is charged with ensuring the jury ultimately impaneled to decide the case is composed
exclusively of impartial jurors. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
103. Peremptory challenges may not be exercised discriminatorily. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 88
(1986).
[Vol. 23:369
TAKING THE HIGH ROAD
allotted for voir dire is often too brief to develop sufficient information about any
individual prospective juror to adequately evaluate his or her qualifications to sit
as an impartial juror,1°4 threatening the constitutional make-up of the jury.
Limited information from a limited number of jurors due to limited voir dire time
makes it difficult to confirm juror impartiality and build a record for challenges
for cause where impartiality is lacking. Accomplishing the more complicated task
necessary to effectively exercise peremptory challenges becomes nearly impos-
sible: construction and analysis of a rubric of subtly communicated attitudes and
beliefs held by multiple jurors across a number of case-specific issues that may
affect the outcome of the trial.
Judges in state and federal court have become increasingly unwilling to
allocate significant time to the jury selection process. 10 5 Possible reasons for
judicial truncation of voir dire include judges' frustration with lawyers' misuse of
the voir dire process and an attempt to manage the courts' schedules in light of
increasing caseloads. At the least restrictive end of this trend are judges who
significantly truncate the time given to advocates to interface directly with the
jury and ask questions on voir dire. 106 At the most restrictive end are judges,
including a fair number of federal trial court judges, who have suspended the
lawyer-venire interaction in favor of a bench-venire model whereby lawyers
submit their questions in advance to the judge and the judge, if he or she approves
of the question, will pose it to the venire.10 7 In either case, commentators have
criticized the allotted time for voir dire as being too brief to elicit a threshold
amount of information from the venire to make informed decisions on the
exercise of challenges, both peremptory and for-cause.10 8 Even when given
adequate questioning time, however, the exercise is of little utility if the lawyers
ask bad questions. Judges, commentators, and empirical researchers agree that
lawyers, generally, are unskilled in the type and manner of questioning that elicits
useful information from potential jurors. 10 9 The majority of trial lawyers
104. See generally Rachael A. Ream, Limited Voir Dire: Why It Fails to Detect Juror Bias, 23 CRIM. JUST. 22
(2009).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 25.
107. Id; see also Bennett, supra note 5, at 150 (concluding that judge-dominated voir dire severely hampers
effective elimination of biased jurors).
108. Id.
109. Some conclude that lawyers are operating near chance levels (i.e., 50% accuracy) in predicting juror
verdicts. See generally Reid Hastie, Is Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire an Effective Procedure of the Selection of
Impartial Juries?, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 703,726 (1991). "Attorneys disagree substantially about what information
to rely on, which jurors to select, and they consistently produce low levels of accuracy in judging juror verdict
preference prejudices." Id. at 722; see also Michael 0. Finkelstein & Bruce Levin, Clear Choices and
Guesswork in Peremptory Challenges in Federal Criminal Trials, 160 J. RoYAL STAT. SOC'Y (PART Two) 275
(1997); Hans Zeisel & Shari Seidman Diamond, The Effect of Peremptory Challenges on Jury and Verdict: An
Experiment in Federal District Court, 30 STAN. L. REv. 491 (1978).
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themselves acknowledge this sad state of affairs." 0 In one study, approximately
75% of lawyers confessed that they gained no predictive power at all, or very
little in a small number of cases, about how jurors would receive evidence in a
given case as a result of the voir dire process."' Lawyers' "gut feeling" that voir
dire questioning did not help them better "select" a jury has been confirmed by a
large body of empirical research.
1
'12
One of the most frequently cited comments on the inefficacy of peremptory
challenges was made by Dale W. Broeder, who conducted an early systematic
study of the voir dire process: 113 "Voir dire was grossly ineffective not only in
weeding out 'unfavorable' jurors but even in eliciting the data which would have
shown that particular jurors are likely to prove 'unfavorable.' 114 Broeder
conducted 225 post-trial juror interviews and determined that a number of jurors
failed to reveal potentially prejudicial views or relevant information during the
questioning process." 5 Other research studies confirm lawyers' common failure
to get prospective jurors to reveal information that would suggest potential bias,
such as whether the juror had been convicted of a crime, knew the defendant, or
had a relative who had been a victim of a similar crime. 1 6 Researchers Zeisel and
Diamond studied the effectiveness of peremptory challenges in twelve federal
trials and concluded that "voir dire.., did not provide sufficient information for
attorneys to identify prejudiced jurors. The average score of the prosecution was
110. Marvin Zalman & Olga Tsoudis, Plucking Weeds from the Garden: Lawyers Speak About Voir Dire, 51
WAYNE L. REV. 163, 383 (2005); see also Ernest Hawrish & Eugene Tate, Determinants of Jury Selection, 39
SASK. L. REV. 285 (1974); Kallen, Peremptory Challenges Based Upon Juror Background: A Rational Use?, 13
TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 143 (1969).
111. Zalman & Tsoudis, supra note 110, at 383.
112. See, e.g., Dale W. Broeder, supra note 101; Solomon M. Fulero & Steven D. Penrod, Attorney Jury
Selection Folklore: What Do They Think and How Can Psychologists Help?, 3 FORENSIC REP. 233 (1990);
Hawrish & Tate, supra note 110; George Hayden, Joseph Senna & Larry Siegel, Prosecutorial Discretion in
Peremptory Challenges: An Empirical Investigation of Information Use in the Massachusetts Jury Selection
Process, 13 NEw ENG. L. REv. 768 (1978); Susan E. Jones, Judge Versus Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire: An
Empirical Investigation of Juror Candor, 11 LAW & HuM. BErtAV. 131 (1987); Kallen, supra note 110; William
H. Levit, Dorothy W. Nelson, Vaughn C. Ball & Richard. Chernick, Expediting Voir Dire: An Empirical Study,
44 S. CAL. L. REv. 916, 940-46 (1970-71); Robert MacCoun, Experimental Research on Jury Decision-
Making, 30 JuRmErRIcs J. 223 (1989); David Suggs & Bruce D. Sales, Juror Self-Disclosure in the Voir Dire: A
Social Science Analysis, 56 IND. L.J. 245, 251-52 (1981). See generally Reid Hastie, Is Attorney-Conducted Voir
Dire an Effective Procedure of the Selection of Impartial Juries?, 40 Am. U. L. REv. 703, 726 (1991). Contra
Hans Zeisel & Shari Seidman Diamond, The Effect of Peremptory Challenges on Jury and Verdict: An
Experiment in a Federal District Court, 30 STAN. L. REv. 491, 528 (1978) (finding attorneys succeeded to a
limited extent).
113. See generally Broeder, supra note 101.
114. Id. at 505.
115. ld. at 503.
116. See, e.g., Richard Seltzer, Mark A. Venuti & Grace M. Lopes, Juror Honesty During the Voir Dire, 19 J.
CRIm. JusT. 451,460 (1991), reprinted in THE JURy TRIAL IN CRIMINAL JusIca 214-32, 220 (Douglas D. Koski
ed., 2003).
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near the zero point... [and] defense counsel performed only slightly better. '
These findings were confirmed by Selzer, Venuti and Lopes when they compared
the answers of 190 potential jurors during voir dire with their answers in
post-trial interviews.' 18 Although the jurors had each been seated on a criminal
trial (of 31 studied), the lawyers-failed to elicit information that would be
potentially important in exercising peremptory challenges. For example, more
than 50% or the jurors did not disclose that they had been a crime victim
themselves; 29.6% did not disclose they had close friends or relatives who were
in law enforcement; and 47% did not share their belief that if the defendant
testifies at trial he must prove his innocence. 119
iii. Failure to Confirm Shared Definitions Produces Misinformation
As the Laurel Holliday case illustrates, the problem of definitional disconnects
during voir dire cannot be overestimated.' 20 Attorneys too often craft questions
telegraphically, where the language employed has a specific meaning for the
questioning attorney, without ensuring that the jurors share the definition. As a
result, jurors may believe they are answering truthfully, but, in fact, may be
answering an entirely different question than the one intended by the attorney.
Although anecdotal evidence alone makes a vulnerable platform for an argument
with respect to any aspect of jury trial work,' 21 an account or two from the real
world of trial practice can illustrate the severity of a problem well-documented by
empirical research.
One example comes from a civil lawsuit where a mid-level manager of Arab
descent filed a Title VII action against his former employer, a fast food restaurant,
claiming he had been fired because of his race. The restaurant replied that he had
been terminated in response to complaints that he had sexually harassed his
subordinates and created a sexually hostile working environment. I represented
the restaurant. Shortly after filing an answer in the lawsuit, we received almost a
dozen affidavits signed by female restaurant employees attesting that none of
117. Hans Zeisel & Shari Seidman Diamond, The Effect of Peremptory Challenges on Jury and Verdict: An
Experiment in a FederalDistrict Court, 30 STAN. L. REv. 491, 528 (1978).
118. See Seltzer et al., supra note 116.
119. Id. at 458-60.
120. This is especially true considering the Ninth Circuit ruled that a new trial was not required in the Stella
Nickell case because Holliday's answers on voir dire were not false. The court cited McDonough Power
Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548 (1984), saying that to obtain a new trial based upon less than
truthful answers during voir dire, "a party must first demonstrate that a juror failed to answer honestly a material
question on voir dire, and then further show that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a
challenge for cause." Id at 556. In the case of Ms. Holliday, the Ninth Circuit found there to be a significant
difference between a product contamination case and a product tampering case. "Holliday was asked only
whether she, or any member of her family, had been involved in a product tampering case. It is difficult to
understand what response by the juror would have been more appropriate than her denial." United States v.
Nickell, 883 F.2d 824, 827 (9th Cir. 1989).
121. NEEL VIDmAR & VALERIE HANs, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDIcr 17 (2007).
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them had ever been subjected to or witnessed any sexual harassment by the
plaintiff. This was curious in light of the complaints by the assistant manager
about the plaintiff's inappropriate behavior.
I interviewed the young women, all between the ages of 16 and 18, and I asked
them about the work environment at the restaurant. They told me that the plaintiff
was a "funny guy" who liked to "joke around" and that his "joking" included,
among other behaviors: snapping their bra straps, twisting their nipples, holding a
banana between his legs while shooting whipping cream from his crotch, and
telling an employee he would "teach her how to do the books if she would give
him a blow job."' 2 2 1 asked the women why they didn't consider this behavior to
be sexual harassment. They answered, "It's not like he meant it, he was just
joking around, like all the boys at high school."
This story underscores the need to explore and confirm speakers' definition of
terms and concepts when eliciting and analyzing information, both those used by
the questioner and the responder. This confirmation of shared definitions, while
critical, is rarely done during voir dire. This may be because lawyers are
generally under-trained (if not untrained) in effective questioning techniques and
thus fail to appreciate the dangers of misconstrued terminology. It also might be a
matter of trial strategy on the part of the lawyer to skip the process of defining
terms in the interest of time if she believes the risk of misunderstanding is
relatively slight. A lawyer may believe, for example, that "everyone knows" the
meaning of a commonly used term such as "assault" or "domestic violence" and
thus there is no need to explore the jurors' subjective understanding. If wrong,
however, this assumption can be fatal to accurate information gathering and
analysis.
Another example comes from my own experience as a juror while I was still a
state prosecutor. During the voir dire on one case, the prosecutor asked if anyone
in the venire had ever been assaulted or witnessed an assault. I did not raise my
hand. I truthfully could not recall any assault, of any kind, and so I sat silent while
others talked of their various experiences over the next half hour. As voir dire
progressed, we learned that the case involved a woman accused of stabbing a man
in a downtown low-rent hotel. She claimed self-defense, saying the man she
stabbed had attacked her. The man denied the event entirely. The defendant
argued the man was a chronic alcoholic who suffered frequently from blackouts,
and that he was drunk and operating in a blackout at the time he came at her with
a knife.
As we moved to the second round of voir dire, both the prosecutor and defense
counsel having explored our experiences (not our attitudes or beliefs) with
assaults, the prosecutor asked an entirely different type of question: "Has anyone
122. At one point I must have appeared rather taken aback because one young woman asked me, "Would that
bother you?" to which I replied, "Call me a prude, but, yes, if my boss were twisting my nipples at work, that
would bother me."
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here ever had anyone raise a knife, or any other tool towards them that they felt
was threatening?" What a difference a single question made. I immediately
recognized this experience as one I had lived through. In fact, as I thought back
on it, the facts of my own experience were eerily similar to the facts of the case:
when I was a young teenager, an alcoholic relative 123 who suffered from
blackouts came after me with a knife. I hid in a bathroom, holding a pair of
scissors, ready to defend myself if need be. What a great witness I would have
been for the defense in the jury deliberation room! A shadow advocate if not an
invisible expert witness. But why hadn't I raised my hand when asked if I had
been assaulted? I was a lawyer. I was a criminal prosecutor. I well knew that
menacing another with a knife constituted assault. Why did "I not tell the court I
had been assaulted? The answer, I realized, was that as a teenager in the 1970s,
long before domestic violence became the subject of movies of the week or
after-school specials, I had not learned anything of 'assaults,' and thus I had not
labeled the event as one. When asked to retrieve 'assault' experience, I checked
under "assault" in my mental databank and came up empty-handed. It was only
when the prosecutor abandoned the label "assault" and factually described the
behavior did I recognize it as a life experience. 1
24
.Another "real world" example of the danger of using shorthand definitions
comes from the O.J. Simpson murder trial. In that case, the prospective jurors
were asked to complete a written juror questionnaire before coming into the court
for voir dire, due to the highly publicized nature of the case and the issues
involved. The questionnaire was 75 pages long and contained over 300 questions,
including the following:
162. Have you ever experienced domestic violence in your home, either
growing up or as an adult? Yes? No? Please describe the circumstances and
what impact it has had on you:
163. Have you ever had a relative or close friend experience domestic
violence? Yes? No? If yes, please explain the circumstances and what affect it
has had on you:
These questions, undoubtedly crafted with care by some very motivated and
experienced trial lawyers, are potentially fatally flawed in their use of telegraphic
123. My brother, Christopher P. Howard (J.D. 1990, Stanford Law School, M.B.A. 2000, Harvard Business
School), when reading earlier drafts of this article, thought it prudent to note that, although he has many vices,
he is not this alcoholic relative.
124. Interestingly, when I realized I had in fact been assaulted-and was a victim of domestic violence, no
less-I was slightly reluctant to discuss the details with the court. Although the judge had assured us we could
request an opportunity to answer any questions that made us uncomfortable in chambers, this was not a helpful
solution in my particular situation. I did not care that a roomful of strangers learned the details of a chapter of
my childhood; my hesitation was about telling the judge, the bailiff, the prosecutor, the defense lawyer, and the
court reporter-all my co-workers on some level-and all who would be in chambers with me during any
"private" questioning. I reported what had happened to me, and I was thanked and excused summarily.
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terms such as "domestic violence" and "abusive relationship." For instance,
imagine a prospective juror responding to Question 162. "Have you experienced
domestic violence in your home... ?" What if she defines "domestic violence"
to include only physical violence that produces an injury or requires medical
assistance? She may have been shoved or slapped by a husband or boyfriend, but
would still answer, truthfully, "No." What if she defines "domestic violence" to
include only violence that the actor intended, and thus if he were drunk it would
not qualify? And what about the limitation, "Have you ever experienced domestic
violence in your home?" (emphasis added). Presumably, the questioner intended
to reference violence in the context of a familial relationship by adding the words
"in your home." However, the words act as a limitation to the scope of the
question. The prospective juror may think back and recall that her husband has hit
her in the car, in the park, at the bar, but never in the home, prompting her to
truthfully respond "No."
Similar problems are found in the wording of Question 163, "Have you ever
had a relative or a close friend experience domestic violence?" The questioner
presumably wants to know what the prospective juror's attitudes, beliefs, ex-
periences,'and preconceptions are with respect to domestic violence. Limiting the
question, however, to the juror's experience vis- -vis close friends and relatives
may well provide misinformation to the questioning lawyer. For example, a juror
with strong views about domestic violence as a result of living next door to a
battered woman would not respond affirmatively to this question if the neighbor
was neither a relative nor close friend.125 The same is true if the strong opinions
were developed from experience with a co-worker, a teacher, or a classmate as
long as the juror did not categorize them as a "close friend."
The failure to confirm shared definitions is one reason why voir dire does not
reliably produce adequate information for attorneys to effectively exercise
peremptory challenges. This failure could be remedied to some extent through
education of both judges and lawyers in effective questioning techniques. 126
Even if this flaw in the voir dire process were corrected, however, there are
additional reasons peremptory challenges lack utility.
iv. Educating the Jury Doesn't Produce Information
Although the legitimate purpose of voir dire is to obtain information from
prospective jurors in order to make a record for a challenge for cause or to inform
the lawyer on how best to exercise her peremptory challenges, many lawyers
instead use their allotted time to try to educate or indoctrinate the jury with
125. And who constitutes a relative? Is an ex-sister-in-law related to you? How about an ex-wife?
126. Presumably it would be easier to accomplish the widespread education of judges than of lawyers, both
because the court could more easily control the requirement and provision of the training and because judges
would have more frequent opportunities to practice the skill.
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respect to the themes and theories of their case. 127 This misuse of voir dire12 8
does not assist a lawyer in making informed decisions when exercising
peremptory challenges because the lawyer is dispensing information to, and not
gathering information from, the jurors. Because of this, "educational" voir dire is
usually characterized by stretches where the lawyer does a disproportionate
amount of the talking. In an early study, attorneys spent about 80% of the voir
dire indoctrinating the jurors by "commenting on points of law, preparing jurors
for the trial, and ingratiating themselves" with the jury. 129 In another study,
researchers also discovered this pattern of attorneys talking to jurors, rather than
eliciting information from jurors:
[O]nly forty-one percent of all statements during the voir dire were made by
prospective jurors. Even this figure is misleadingly high because it does not
reflect either the nature or the length of the statements. Less than one percent of
all comments by jurors were unsolicited. The remainder were rather perfunc-
tory replies to questions by the attorneys. Most juror statements consisted of
only a single word, usually yes or no. The attorneys, in other words, clearly
dominated the voir dire. 130
Prospective jurors do not generally volunteer information during jury selec-
tion. This is understandable given the unfamiliarity and the formality of the
courtroom setting, which can be intimidating to many prospective jurors.
1 3 1
Although research establishes that the majority of potential jurors are truthful, 132
they are also highly motivated to put their best image forward when subjected to
public questioning. 133 They are understandably guarded and cautious in both
interpreting the questions put to them and in formulating their responses. They
127. See Broeder, supra note 101, at 522; see also Randolph N. Jonakait, THE AMERIcAN JURY SYSTEM 130
(Yale Univ. Press 2003) (Attorneys seek to "indoctrinate, socialize, and educate prospective jurors"). See
generally Levit, et al., supra note 112, at 940-46.
128. Not all commentators consider education and indoctrination of the jury a poor use of voir dire, noting
that it performs a socialization function for the venire. See, e.g., Robert W. Balch et al., The Socialization of
Jurors: The Voir Dire As a Rite of Passage, 4 J. CRIM. JUST. 271, 272, 280 (1976), reprinted in THE JURY TRIAL
IN CRIMINAL JusTicE at 203 (Douglas D. Koski ed., 2003). The time is misused, however, if the goal is to elicit
information upon which challenges will be based. In addition, such efforts to educate the jury risk improperly
exposing the jury to facts, law, or argument that would be impermissible in opening statement.
129. Reid Hastie, Is Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire an Effective Procedure for the Selection of Impartial
Juries?, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 703, 708 (1991) (citing Professor Broeder's research findings in the late 1950's).
130. Balch et al., supra note 128, at 276.
131. Id. Given that voir dire is the first dialogue between attorneys and prospective jurors, in a highly
authoritarian and formal setting in the presence of the judge, jurors may perceive they are being "interrogated."
132. See, e.g., Broeder, supra note 101, at 510-14 (noting that researchers found seven to fifty percent of
jurors gave inaccurate responses during jury selection, but they did not conclude the inaccurate responses were
due to intentional deception).
133. See, e.g., Robert Helnreich & Barry Collins, Situational Determinants of Affiliative Preference Under
Stress, 6 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCbOL. 79 (1967); Paul McGhee & Richard Teevan, Conformity Behavior
and Need for Affiliation, 72 J. Soc. PSYC-OL. 117 (1967); Irving Sarnoff & Philip Zimbardo, Anxiety, Fear and
Social Affiliation, 62 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 356 (1961).
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want to give answers that are socially acceptable and noncontroversial.1 34 They
want to avoid looking mean-spirited, unfair, biased, prejudiced, uneducated, or
unintelligent. 135
Thus, it is unsurprising that some questions, simply by the way they are
phrased, lead jurors to answer in ways that make them "look good." These are
questions that have a predictable "right" answer. Asking jurors in a criminal case,
"Do you believe that you could be a fair and impartial juror?" will predictably
produce the socially acceptable answer "yes. 136 Jurors are very reluctant to
admit that they could not be fair. So, although perhaps not technically leading in
phrasing, the question is in essence a leading one because there is only one
"right" answer. Jurors are also quick to agree with the judge or examining lawyer
when the "question" is presented as a statement of law or legal procedure. For
example, it is difficult to imagine a juror who has grown up in the United-States,
not knowing the "right" answer to the question "do you understand the defendant
is presumed innocent unless the government proves he is guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt?" Not only is the mantra familiar to anyone who has watched
any American films or television, the introductory phrase "do you understand"
strongly telegraphs that the mantra is, in fact, true. A far better method to test the
juror's actual understanding of this concept of innocence would be to present a
hypothetical question such as, "If you were to go into the jury deliberation room
right now, how would you vote, guilty or innocent, on the charges facing my
client?"'
137
In educational voir dire, "questions" posed to the venire are really statements
presented to the venire with a demand for juror agreement. Frequently these
mantras are prefaced with the phrase, "Do you understand that. . . " "Would you
be able to follow the law that ... ." or "You appreciate the fact that.. . ." For
example, a criminal defense lawyer may ask, "Do you understand that the
defendant is presumed innocent unless and until the government proves beyond a
reasonable doubt that he committed the crime?" Implicit in the wording is the
134. See SEYMOUR SuDmAN & NORMAN M. BRADBURN, ASKING QUESTIONS (Jossey-Bass 1982); see also
Mary R. Rose & Shari Seidman Diamond, Judging Bias: Juror Confidence and Judicial Rulings on Challenges
for Cause, 42 L. & Soc'Y REV. 513, 516 (2008) (citing Gary Moran & Brian Cutler, The Prejudicial Impact of
Pretrial Publicity, 21 J. ApP. Soc. PSYCHOL. 345, 345-67 (1991)); Neil Vidmar, Generic Prejudice and the
Presumption of Guilt in Sex Abuse Trials, 21 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 5, 5-25 (1997)).
135. "Voir dire was grossly ineffective not only in weeding out 'unfavorable'jurors but even in eliciting the
data which would have shown that particular jurors are likely to prove 'unfavorable."' Broeder, supra note 101,
at 505. The Supreme Court recognized this phenomenon in saying "[njo doubt each juror was sincere when he
said that he would be fair and impartial... but the psychological impact (of] requiring such a declaration before
one's fellows is often its father." Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 728 (1961).
136. This phenomenon has been identified by social scientists as the "social desirability effect." Hazel
Markus & R. B. Zajonc, The Cognitive Perspective in Social Psychology, in THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 137, 184 (Gardner Lindzey & Elliot Aronson eds., 3d ed. 1985).
137. In over twenty years in the courtroom, I have yet to hear a juror answer anything but a variation of "I
don't know, I haven't heard the evidence yet." This response provides a great platform to explore juror
preconceptions and assumptions with respect to the presumption of innocence.
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"right" answer-that this is a correct statement of the law-and the answer will
be a non-reflective "yes." It is a self-confident juror, indeed, who will disagree
publicly with a trained lawyer as to what the "law" is, especially when the lawyer
"tells" the juror it is so. Instead of inviting the jurors to open up and express their
attitudes and beliefs, this method of "force-feeding" the venire tends to browbeat
them into facially agreeing with the "right" statement, whether they even
understand it, let alone agree.138
This "agreement" phenomenon is documented by the empirical research. In
one study, 43% of lawyers' "questions" were actually instructional statements
like these, which the researchers referred to as indoctrination remarks. 139 The
research suggested that this "educational" voir dire was unlikely to separate
biased and unbiased jurors because jurors tended to provide the expected
answers. 140 In answers to over 2,000 questions that were "leading" in nature
(suggesting the desired response), only two responses (. 1%) failed to match the
attorney's suggested "right" response. 141 The finding has been attributed to the
virtual demand of the attorneys for juror agreement-all in a public setting. 
142
When lawyers use their limited questioning time to try to educate or
indoctrinate jurors on issues, themes, and the law by using long, leading
questions that end with a request for confirmation that the juror "understands" or
"agrees," the lawyer is not gathering information about the jurors. It is also
doubtful that such browbeating provides much of an "education." Even
experienced attorneys misuse limited voir dire questioning time in this way.
Consider, by way of example, a series of questions put to a prospective juror in
the trial of NFL football player Ray Lewis.
14 3
In 2000, Mr. Lewis and two friends were charged with the stabbing deaths of
two men outside an Atlanta bar after a Super Bowl party. 44 The trial began in
138. See Balch et al., supra note 128, at 271 ("Upon entering the strangely formal world of the courtroom...
most prospective jurors are anxious and ready to be led. They are prepared to be molded into the juror's role by
anyone willing to offer direction."); see also Bennett, supra note 5, at 160.
139. Balch et al., supra note 128, at 276.
140. Id. at 278. The researchers noted that during educational voir dire, the attorneys' leading questions
"virtually demanded a public commitment to the ideal norms of fairness and impartiality" such that only one
percent of jurors expressed any disagreement. Balch et al., supra note 128, reprinted in THE JURY TRIAL IN
CRmI NAL JusTicE at 211 (Douglas D. Koski ed., 2003). Although "personal-biographical information should
have occupied most of the attorneys' attention since the purpose of voir dire is to ascertain the relevant feelings
and experiences of the prospective jurors ... most of the information appeared to be of little use." Balch et al.,
supra note 128, reprinted in THE JURY TRIAL IN CRIMINAL JusTIcE at 209 (Douglas D. Koski ed., 2003).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Mr. Lewis is a linebacker who plays for the Baltimore Ravens. Thomas George, On Pro Football; From
Threat of Prison to Exultation, N.Y. TtMEs, Jan. 20, 2001, at D1, available at http://www.nytimes.com2001/01/
30/sports/on-pro-footbal-from-threat-of-prison-to-exultation.html.
144. Despite the double homicide charge and the accompanying media coverage in 2000, Mr. Lewis went on
that year to win Super Bowl XXXV MVP honors, Defensive Player of the Year honors, a unanimous All-Pro
selection, and another start in the Pro Bowl. Id.
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May of 2000 at the Fulton County Courthouse before Judge Alice Bonner.145
Prosecutor Paul Howard 146 and two assistants represented the People. Each of the
three defendants was represented in court by two attorneys. Due to the pretrial
publicity, the prospective jurors had been asked to complete questionnaires and
were brought into court individually to be questioned. One potential juror came
into the courtroom, seemingly nervous as she climbed into the empty jury box to
be questioned. The juror looked to be in her sixties, reported being retired from
her work as a custodian, and confirmed she had limited formal education. One of
the defense attorneys engaged in the following voir dire dialogue14 7 with the
juror:
Q: You're not opposed to someone defending themselves?
A: Huh?
Q: You're not opposed to someone defending themselves?
A: Huh?
Q: You're not opposed to someone defending themselves?
A: What does "opposed" mean?
Q: Well, you're not saying you don't think people can't defend themselves.
You're not saying that because others say they did something that you think so?
A: Uh, ... okay.
The defense lawyer gathered absolutely no information about the prospective
juror as a result of this exchange, nor was he trying to. It is also doubtful that the
woman was "educated" as a result of the lawyer's repeated mantra. Further, as
she was questioned in the absence of other potential jurors, the lawyer could not
have been trying to educate the rest of the venire, even if the "education" was lost
on this particular juror. Empirical evidence and anecdotal accounts both confirm
that this misuse of questioning time during voir dire is the rule, and not the
exception.
v. Relying on Demographics Is Untrustworthy
During voir dire, a lawyer aspires to discover the jurors' attitudes, beliefs,
preconceptions, and biases that will shape not only their interpretation of evi-
dence, but their very willingness to receive, process, and store information. 148 In
145. I was in Atlanta teaching the Emory Law School's Annual Trial Skills program when the trial began.
The day before the students' mock trial the faculty had the afternoon off, and I went down to observe jury
selection.
146. No relation to the author.
147. I have reported the colloquy to the best of my recollection. Although I have not been able to review a
transcript of the voir dire, I took copious notes, which I have to this day.
148. See, e.g., Valerie P. Hans & Alayna Jehle, The Jury in Practice: Avoid Bald Men and People with Green
Socks?, 78 C.-KINT L. REv. 1179, 1180 (2003) ("Life experiences and preconceptions contribute to the
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the absence of particular information about individual prospective. jurors,
however, a lawyer is forced to fall back on demographics such as educational
background, race, age, gender, and occupation when exercising peremptory
challenges. A large amount of empirical research suggests, however, that demo-
graphics are poor predictors of the underlying attitudes, beliefs, preconceptions,
and biases that shape jurors' perception of the evidence. 149 As such, demograph-
ics are associated weakly and unreliably with juror verdicts.' 50 In fact, the em-
pirical research "calls into question the premise that jurors' votes during
deliberation can be reliably predicted from juror characteristics that are
observable before the trial."
1 51
In a particular venue or case, there may be a useful relationship between an
attitude and a demographic characteristic such as occupation or educational level,
but the relationship is often weak. Attitudes and biases often cut across demo-
graphic lines. For example, a lawyer might assume, based on demographics
alone, that a juror who is a white, male, conservative corporate executive will be
pro-management in an employment discrimination case. But that assumption
would be wrong if the juror's underlying belief is that the political climate of
most companies makes it easier for management to deny that a discrimination
problem exists than to take corrective action, or if that juror had relevant personal
experience, such as a wife or daughter who had been discriminated against in the
workplace.
Another example from my experience may be instructive as to the lack of
predictive power of demographics. While I was a prosecutor, I was part of a
venire assigned to a criminal trial where the defendant stood accused of car theft
and attempting to elude the police. During jury selection, we learned the police
had called in the license plates of a "suspicious" car and, learning it had been
reported stolen, they activated their emergency lights and sirens. The driver took
off, and a high-speed chase ensued. Several other police cars joined the pursuit,
following the suspect's car through multiple red lights and populated retail
parking lots. The chase was extended and occurred at night.
The police finally stopped the suspect, boxing his car with their police cruisers.
The suspect was black and the officer who went up to the car for his identification
was white. When the suspect handed over his driver's license, the officer went to
call in his information, and the suspect took off. The police went to the address on
the driver's license, where a black man matching the picture on the license
narrative or story that jurors develop as they listen to evidence and decide the case. Evidence that is inconsistent
with jurors' preconceptions and the developing story may be discounted or ignored.... Attitudes tend to be
more powerful predictors of verdict choices than demographic characteristics.").
149. See, e.g., Robert J. MacCoun, Experimental Research on Jury Decision-Making, 244 Sci. 1046, 1047
(1989).
150. Id.
151. Id.
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answered the door. They arrested him, although he staunchly maintained it was a
case of mistaken identity and that his cousin had taken his driver's license. It was
clear the issue in the case was going to be the reliability of the cross-racial
eyewitness identification of the defendant by the police. I was one of the first
twelve members of the venire, and so presumptively on the petit jury. When it
came time for exercising challenges, defense counsel conferred with his client,
who glared at me and shook his head. I was excused. The jury came back with a
guilty verdict in under an hour.
I spoke to the defense lawyer later to discuss the case. He admitted that as a
white prosecutor there was no way I would have been allowed to serve on the
jury. My demographic profile (white,1 52 prosecutor) strongly suggested I would
be hostile to the defense. The reverse, however, was true. My experience-my
individual profile-suggested I would be a liability for the prosecution. As a
psychology major in college I had read several empirical studies by Dr. Elizabeth
Loftus153 on the unreliability of eyewitness identification in general, 154 and
cross-racial eyewitness identification in particular. 55 Because of that, I found it
hard to imagine, based on what I had heard in voir dire, that the state would have
been able to prove to me beyond a reasonable doubt that a white officer, at night,
for a few minutes, after a high-speed chase, with his adrenaline pumping, holding
the suspect's identification and believing that they had the suspect in firm
custody, would have had the motivation or ability to accurately record the salient
152. Race is a common demographic considered by attorneys exercising peremptory challenges. A 1984 jury
study in Chicago documented that in a single month "prosecutors eliminated blacks at more than double the rate
that they excluded whites in selecting juries for trials of black defendants," despite the fact that the both groups
had similar backgrounds. Douglas Frantz, Many Blacks Kept Off Juries Here, Cn. Tam., Aug. 5, 1984, at 1. This
is not to say that race is not a predictive demographic: empirical evidence strongly suggests that it is. See, e.g.,
John Monahan & Elizabeth F Loftus, The.Psychology of Law, 33 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 441,448 (1982). However,
the fact that a peremptory challenge based on race might be well-grounded makes it no less unconstitutional.
153. Dr. Loftus is a Distinguished Professor in the Department of Psychology and Social Behavior, the
Department of Criminology, Law, and Society, and the Department of Cognitive Sciences, and a Fellow of The
Center for the Neurobiology of Learning and Memory at the University of California, Irvine. She is also an
Affiliate Professor of Law at the University of Washington. She has been recognized for over a decade as the
preeminent expert in the field, "amassing a clear and brilliant body of work showing that memory is amazingly
fragile and inventive." Monahan & Loftus, supra note 152, at 448.
154. See, e.g., EYEwrrNESS TEsTimoNY: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth F. Loftus
eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1984); ELIZABETH F LoFrus, EYEWINESS T)sTimoNY (1979); ELIZABETH F LoFrus
& JAMES M. DOYLE, EYEWITNESS TEIisimoNY: CIVIL AND CRiNAL (Lexis Law Publishing 3rd ed. 1977);
ELIZABETH LoFrus & KATHERINE KETcHAM, WrrNEsS FOR THE DEFENSE (1991); Jane Goodman & Elizabeth F
Loftus, Judgment and Memory: The Role of Expert Psychological Testimony on Eyewitness Accuracy, in
PSYCHOL. & Soc. POL'Y (Peter Suedfeld & Philip E. "etlock eds., 1992); Paul M. Camper & Elizabeth F. Loftus,
The Role of Psychologists as Expert Witnesses in the Courtroom: No More Daniels in the Lions Den, 9 LAW &
PSYCHOL. REv. 1 (1985); Elizabeth F. Loftus, Reconstructing Memory: The Incredible Eyewitness, 15
JuRPuErcs J. 188 (1975); Elizabeth F. Loftus, The Eyewitness on Trial, 16 TRIAL 1, 30-35 (Oct. 1980).
155. Dr. Loftus maintains that cross-racial identifications are "notoriously difficult" and "disproportionately
responsible for wrongful convictions." ELIZABETH F. Loprus, EvEwrwESs khsrtMoNy 136-39 (Harvard Univ.
Press 1979) (citing, in addition to her own research, that of Bringham & Barkowitz (1978), Scott & Foutch
(1974), and Malprass & Kravitz (1969)).
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features of the black man in the car such that he could definitively distinguish him
later. 156
H. ASSESSING THE HARM OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
A. GENDER AND RACE-BASED DEMOGRAPHICS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
In addition to lacking predictive power, the exercise of peremptory challenges
based on group affiliations, stereotypes, and demographic profiles risks violating
constitutional, legislative, and ethical prohibitions against discrimination in jury
selection.157 Ironically, research suggests that the two demographics that actually
have some empirical validity (and are thus "rational" bases for peremptories), are
those that are specifically prohibited by the Constitution: race and gender. 158 As
noted in the Introduction, a number of scholars and commentators have criticized
the use of peremptory challenges precisely because they are used discriminato-
rily, and thus unconstitutionally.1 59 Some have echoed Justice Thurgood Mar-
156. "Although some scientists debate about certain emerging areas of identification confusion, they appear
to be in consensus about this basic perception-storage-recall problem." Wayne T. Westling, The Case for Expert
Witness Assistance to the Jury in Eyewitness Identification Cases, 71 OR. L. REV. 93, 101-02 (1992) (citations
omitted). Moreover, "[t]he fallibility factors which are built into the human mind are accentuated when the
observer is asked to be a formal witness in court." Id.
157. See Batson, supra note 3 and accompanying text. Several states also have ethical rules prohibiting
discrimination in jury selection, expanding the constitutionally prohibited bases to include: disability, age,
sexual orientation, and socio-economic status. MODEL RuLEs R. 8.4 cmt. 3 (deeming such bases as "prejudicial
to the administration of justice").
158. For example, studies have shown that the absence of black citizens on juries results in increased
convictions. See, e.g., Monahan & Loftus, supra note 152. However, the fact that a peremptory challenge based
on race might be well-grounded makes it no less unconstitutional.
159. See, e.g., Albert Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the
Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. Cm. L. REV. 153 (1989); Jose Felipe Anderson, Catch Me If You Can! Resolving
The Ethical Tragedies In the Brave New World of Jury Selection, 32 NEW ENo. L. REV. 343 (1998); Felice
Banker, Note, Eliminating A Safe Haven for Discrimination: Why New York Must Ban Peremptory Challenges
From Jury Selection, 3 J.L. & POL'Y 605 (1995); Bennett, supra note 5, at 150; Karen Bray, Reaching the Final
Chapter in the Story of Peremptory Challenges, 40 UCLA L. REV. 517 (1992); Raymond J. Broderick, Why the
Peremptory Challenge Should Be Abolished, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 369 (1992); Carol A. Chase and Colleen P.
Graffy, A Challenge For Cause Against Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Proceedings, 19 Loy. L.A. INT'L &
COMP. L.J. 507 (1997); Gurney, supra note 5; Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should Be Abolished:
A Trial Judge's Perspective, 64 U. Cm. L. REV. 809 (1997); Eric D. Katz, Striking the Peremptory Challenge
from Civil Litigation: "Hey Batson, Stay Where You Belong!", 11 PACE L. REV. 357 (1991); Andrew D. Leipold,
Constitutionalizing Jury Selection in Criminal Cases: A Critical Evaluation, 86 GEO. L.J. 945 (1998); Nancy S.
Marder, Beyond Gender: Peremptory Challenges and the Roles of the Jury, 73 ThX. L. REV. 1041 (1995); Nancy
S. Marder, Justice Stevens, The Peremptory Challenge, and The Jury, 74 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1683 (2006);
Kenneth Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson and Peremptory Challenges,
71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447 (1996); Charles J. Ogletree, Just Say No! A Proposal to Eliminate Racially
Discriminatory Uses of Peremptory Challenges, 31 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 1099 (1994); Antony Page, Batson's
Blind-Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155 (2005); Amy
Wilson, The End of Peremptory Challenges: A Call For Change Through Comparative Analysis, 32 HAsnNGs
INrr'L & COMP. L. REv. 363 (2009); Hiroshi Fukurai & Edgar W. Butler, Sources of Racial Disenfranchisement
in the Jury and Jury Selection System, 13 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 238 (1994).
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shall's call for the abolition of peremptory challenges entirely.'tr The concern is
that, even after Batson, lawyers still exercise peremptory challenges unconstitu-
tionally, based on race or gender, whether consciously or not. 161 Even commenta-
tors who agree with the Supreme Court1 62 that the net value of the peremptory
challenge supports their retention acknowledge that the risk of discrimination
under the current Batson system is too high and call for system reform.163 The
holding of Batson may prohibit discrimination, they contend, but the Batson test
does not root it out. Attorneys may still use peremptory challenges discriminato-
rily as long as, when challenged, they can identify any race-neutral or gender-
neutral reason.' 64 This is widely known by trial lawyers, who have learned by
experience (or sometimes deliberate training) to be prepared with any reason, as
160. See, e.g., David C. Baldus et al., The Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder Trials: A Legal
and Empirical Analysis, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 3 (2001); Bennett, supra note 5, at 150; Morris B. Hoffman,
Peremptory Challenges Should Be Abolished: A Trial Judge's Perspective, 64 U. Cm. L. REv. 809 (1997);
Nancy S. Marder, Beyond Gender: Peremptory Challenges and the Roles of the Jury, 73 TEx. L. REv. 1041
(1995).
161. See, e.g., Bennett, supra note 5, at 150 ("[J]udge-dominated voir dire and the Batson challenge process
are well-intentioned methods of attempting to eradicate bias from the judicial process, but they actually
perpetuate legal fictions that allow implicit bias to flourish."); B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should Be
Abolished: A Trial Judge's Perspective, 64 U. Cm. L. REv. 809 (1997).
162. In Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965), the Supreme Court accepted the "widely held belief
that [the] peremptory challenge is a necessary part of [the] trial by jury" and necessary to eliminate the
"extremes of partiality" from the jury.
163. Proposed reforms are wide-ranging and include: modification or elimination of the Batson test, exercise
of peremptory challenges exclusively on "blind" questionnaires before the lawyers view the prospective jurors,
and expansion of for-cause challenges to include inconsistent juror answers to questionnaire and in-person
questioning. See, e.g., Jeb C. Griebat, Peremptory Challenge by Blind Questionnaire: The Most. Practical
Solution for Ending the Problem of Racial and Gender Discrimination in Kansas Courts While Preserving the
Necessary Function of the Peremptory Challenge, 12 KAN. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 323 (2003); Jean Montoya, The
Future of the Post-Batson Peremptory Challenge: Voir Dire by Questionnaire and the "Blind" Peremptory, 29
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 981 (1996).
164. A Batson analysis has three steps: challenge, rebuttal, and determination by the judge. The burden of
production is initially on the party making the Batson challenge, then shifts to the other party to provide a
non-discriminatory reason for the challenge. In general, the complaining party need meet a very low threshold
to make a prima facie case suggesting an inference of discrimination, thereby shifting the burden of production.
See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 162-168 (2005); U.S. v. Collins, 551 F.3d 914, 919 (9th Cir.
2009); Aspen v. Bissonnette, 480 F.3d 571, 574-575 (1st Cir. 2007), cert denied, 552 U.S. 934 (2007)
(prima facie burden is not intended to be substantial); U.S. v. Hendrix, 509 F 3d 362, 370 (7th Cir. 2007). That
being said, the threshold for rebutting a prima facie case is equally low. See., e.g., Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765
(1995) (suggesting burden is quite insubstantial). The Batson analysis has been severely criticized. "Because
Batson's framework is flawed, it has produced the lingering and tragic legacy that the courts almost always do
not find purposeful discrimination, regardless of how outrageous the asserted race-neutral reasons are." Bennett,
supra note 5, at 150. Not only is a "facially" objective neutral reason sufficient in most jurisdictions, but some
state and federal courts have accepted a subjective neutrality test. In People v. Algarin, the court refused to
require the prosecutor to provide an objectively neutral reason for the juror challenge. 558 N.E.2d 457 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1990). See also William T. Pizzi, Batson v. Kentucky: Curing the Disease But Killing the Patient, 1987 SuP.
CT. REv. 97, 135 (1987) (footnote omitted) ("In the world of peremptory challenges, where it is acceptable to
challenge jurors based on hunches, body language, pop psychology, political preferences, and economic status,
and where lawyers are encouraged to strike jurors on the basis of their subjective feelings and impulses, there is
no content to the notion of a 'neutral explanation."').
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long as it does not involve race or gender.165 Prosecutors are not immune from
resorting to facially discrimination-free reasons when challenging jurors based
on race or gender. One prosecutor's office is reported to have distributed, as part
of the materials for its 2004 Prosecutor Trial Skills Course, a list of race/gender-
neutral reasons to provide the court in response to a Batson challenge. 166 An
Illinois judge even created a list of such Illinois-case-law-acceptable reasons and
suggested that prosecutors distribute it under the title of "Handy Race-Neutral
Explanations" or "20 Time-Tested Race-Neutral Explanations."'
167
B. LIMITING THE BREADTH OF COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION
HARMS THE SYSTEM
Americans have a negative view of trial lawyers as truth manipulators.1 68 A
2001-2002 poll by the Litigation Section of the American Bar Association
suggests that the public believes lawyers "manipulate both the system and the
truth." 16 9 Every lawyer should be concerned about contributing to this percep-
tion, because, to some extent, perception is reality.' 70 There are more derisive
In short, both the burdens to successfully make and defend against an initial Batson challenge are quite
insubstantial. For an excellent discussion of the jurisdiction-dependent and ever-evolving legal standards for a
successful Batson challenge, see THE LAW OF JURIES, supra note 16, at 144-157.
165. It has never been true that any reason will suffice. The truly ridiculous and inane may be acknowledged
as such. One prosecutor, for example, gave the following "race-neutral" reason: "I have a P rule, I never accept
anyone whose occupation begins with a P. [The juror] is a pipeline operator." United States v. Romero-Reyna,
867 F.2d 834, 837 (5th Cir. 1989). The court saw this for what it was and rejected it. Id. In addition, there is
arguably a trend in recent cases is to take a harder look at race- or gender-neutral reasons offered for challenges
and to reject those which-are found to be pretextual. See, e.g., Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008); Ali v.
Hickman, 571 F.3d 902 (9th Cir. 2009), opinion amended and superseded on denial of rehearing, 2009 WL
3401452 (9th Cir. 2009); Reed v. Quarterman, 555 F.3d 364 (5th Cir. 2009); U.S. v. Williamson, 533 F3d 269
(5th Cir 2008); Green v. LaMarque, 532 F3d 1028 (9th Cir. 2008), opinion modified, 2008 WL 2952801 (9th
Cir. 2008), and as amended, (Aug. 4, 2008); U.S. v. Thompson, 528 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2008), as amended,
(July 1, 2008), and cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 218 (2008), and cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1359 (2009).
166. Reasons To Exclude a Juror, DALLAS MORNING NEws, http://www.dalasnews. com/s/dws/spe/2005/jury/
strikes.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2010); see also Wilson v. Beard, 426 F.3d 653, 656 (3d Cir. 2005) (prosecutors
encouraged to strike black jurors because "blacks from the low-income areas are less likely to convict").
167. People v. Randall, 671 N.E.2d 60, 65-66 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
168. National Law Journal polls confirm that "lawyers' prestige has plummeted at a pace unmatched by that
of other professions during the past 20 years." Chris Klein, Poll: Lawyers Not Liked, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 25, 1997,
at A6. Specifically, Americans perceive that lawyers "manipulate the legal system without regard for right or
wrong." Randall Sambom, Anti-Lawyer Attitude Up, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 9, 1993. In a 1995 poll, three-fourths
(seventy-five percent) of those polled believed average Americans have "less" or "much less" access to justice
in the legal system than rich people. Stephen Budiansky et al., How Lawyers Abuse the Law, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT, Jan. 30, 1995, at 50 et seq. See generally HARVEy R. LEvINE, LEVINE ON TRIAL ADVOCACY: JURY
SELECTION, Ch. 6-B (The Rutter Group 2004).
169. Public Perceptions of Lawyers: Consumer Research Findings, 2002 A.B.A. LrrmG. SEC. 8-9 (2002),
available at http://www.abanet.org/litigation/lawyers/publicperceptions.pdf. The poll used both national
telephone interviews and focus groups. Id.
170. Abraham Lincoln appreciated the significance of public perception, saying, "public sentiment is
everything. With [it], nothing can fail; without it nothing can succeed." THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM
LINCOLN, Vol. 11127 (Roy P. Basler ed., Rutgers Univ. Press 1953).
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jokes about lawyers than there are about any other profession.171 Frequently,
losing parties in civil lawsuits complain that justice was not done and that the
wrong person won-all because he had the "better" lawyer. The collective lay
perception is that trial lawyers are gladiators.' 72 The party with the most
aggressive, tenacious, clever-and maybe unethical-warrior wins the battle,
truth and justice notwithstanding. 173
The majority of Americans consider juries to be the most important part of the
American justice system, according to a 1999 American Bar Association poll. 174
The exercise of a peremptory challenge against a prospective juror who is not
vulnerable to a for-cause challenge is difficult to explain to a non-lawyer citizen
who responds to a summons for jury service and who does not demonstrate an
inability to be impartial -at least not to the satisfaction of the judge. A juror so
excused might resent the denial of the right to participate without explanation. 175
The Supreme Court noted the importance of a prospective juror's right to enjoy
and benefit from the education that accompanies jury service, free of discrimina-
tion. 176 To have served on a jury, in essence, is a "badge of citizenship." This
concept was recognized and embraced almost 170 years ago by Alexis de
Tocqueville, who saw jury service as a free education for citizens, teaching them
first-hand about the principles of democracy.177
Peremptory challenges also injure the community's interest in having a truly
representative cross-section of the community.
171. See generally MARC GALANTER, LOWERING THE BAR: LAWYER JoKES AND LEGAL CULTURE (2005).
172. This perception as lawyers as combatants is not new, nor is it positive. In 1906, Roscoe Pound, later
Dean of the Harvard Law School, spoke at the annual convention of the American Bar Association on "The
Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice." He maintained that "contentiousness
inherent in the adversary system" fostered public dissatisfaction with the justice system and public perception of
lawyers as 'arbitrary, full of technicality, favoring the rich and lagging behind current public opinion and
changed cultural values." Judge J. Thomas Greene, Some Current Causes for Popular Dissatisfaction With the
Administration of Justice, 14 UTAH B.J. 35, 36 (May 2001).
173. Commentators suggest that this negative view of trial lawyers is, in part, what prompted The American
Trial Lawyers' Association (ATLA) in 2006 to change its name to The American Association for Justice (AAJ).
See, e.g., Al Kamen, Just Don't Call Them the Suers, WASH. POST, July 14, 2006, at A19, available at
http://www washingtonpost.com/iwp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/13/AR2006071301505.html.
174. Perceptions of the U.S. Justice System, App. Table 4 A.B.A. Survey (1999), http://www.abanet.org/media/
perception/perceptions.pdf. Sixty-nine percent of respondents viewed juries as the most important part of the
justice system. Id.
175. Reid Hastie, Is Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire an Effective Procedure for the Selection of Impartial
Juries?, 40 Am. U. L. REv. 703, 725 (1991). ("[Tlhe exercise of peremptory challenges during voir dire
produces a negative impression on the typical member of the jury pool. For example, a substantial number of
potential jurors react to the impanelment process with comments about the 'arbitrariness' of the justice system
and the 'waste of time' involved in the voir dire proceedings. Only a few ... jurors interviewed noted that the
procedure probably increases the defendant's impression of fairness of the trial process.").
176. See generally Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
177. See ALEXIS DE TocQuEvILLE, DEMOcRACY IN AMERICA 275 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence trans.,
Anchor Press 1969) (1840).
TAKING THE HIGH RoAD
[Tihe elimination of minority viewpoints discredits the criminal justice system.
Broad societal participation on juries is critical to maintaining public confi-
dence in the fairness of trials.. .  Community participation in the determination
of guilt and innocence promotes confidence in the justness of the system. The
use of peremptory challenges, however, undermines these values by giving
lawyers unfettered discretion to manipulate jury composition for tactical
advantage.
1 78
In Taylor v. Louisiana,1 7 9 the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized the importance
of community participation in the jury process. 80 Noting that a jury representa-
tive of the community better ensures impartiality by placing the common sense of
the community between the defendant and both an overzealous prosecutor and
"the professional or perhaps over conditioned or biased response of a judge," the
Court was confident that the cross-section requirement would promote public
participation in the system and thereby increase public confidence in the fairness
of the system.' 8' Moreover, scholars have recently begun to re-examine the
constitutional jury trial right and conclude that it is actually a collective,
community right.1
8 2
The jury is not merely a symbol of the community. The jury "brings
community consciousness, community values, and culture into the trial sys-
tem."" 3 If the venire is randomly drawn from the community (meeting the
constitutional cross-section requirement), it is presumably representative of the
wider community's attitudes, biases, and beliefs regarding issues in the case, and
consideration of the defendant's guilt or innocence will likewise reflect the
community's collective values.184 Without evidence that a particular juror is
unable to sit impartially and decide that case, the exercise of peremptory
178. Gurney, supra note 5, 227, 236. ("If the community, through its jury representatives, participates in
reaching a verdict, acceptance of that verdict and of the justice system in general will be enhanced. But if the
verdict is the product of a select part of the community, respect for, and acceptance of, the verdict delivered by
such a group will suffer.").
179. 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (holding that a defendant enjoys Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to ajury
selected from a representative cross-section of the community). The right is to a representative jury pool, not a
representative petit jury.
180. Id. at 530.
181. See id. at 530 (citation omitted).
182. See, e.g., Laura I. Appleman, The Lost Meaning of the Jury Trial Right, 84 IND. L.J. 397, 398 (2009)
(arguing the Sixth Amendment jury trial right, although grammatically structured as a right of the accused, is
actually a restatement of the collective right to trial in Article inI); Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and Formalism
in Criminal Procedure: The Triumph of Justice Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants?, 94 GEO.
L.J. 183, 196-97 (2005) (arguing that Article EIl was intended to protect the right of the people to administer
justice, and is thus not an individual right to be waived); Steven A. Engel, The Public's Vicinage Right: A
ConstitutionalArgument, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1658 (2000) (arguing the public has a constitutional right to locally
administer justice and adjudicate criminal trials). See generally AKmi REED AMAR, THE BIL OF RIGHTs:
CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998).
183. Gary Goodpaster, On the Theory ofAmerican Adversary Criminal Trial, 78 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
118, 146 (1987).
184. Gurney, supra note 5, at 245.
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challenges distorts the representative nature of the jury.
It is generally easy for judges and lawyers to agree on those prospective jurors
who are extremely biased. However, once a trial judge has determined that a
juror's views will not impair her ability to follow instructions on the law and
evidence, i.e., once the judge has rejected a cause challenge, no reason exists
for excusing the juror. Indeed, if the jury pool is representative, and cause
challenges have already eliminated the extremes of partiality, further tampering
will only muzzle the community's various voices in exchange for a doubtful
increase in the quality of the jury.... The message of Taylor is that this
diversity is the genius of the jury system. 185
The reality is that all jurors are biased in that they bring their own set of life
experiences and values to their jury service. 186 Furthermore, jurors are instructed
by the judge to draw on their life experiences and common sense in deciding the
case.187 The collective bias of the jury is what ensures community representation
and participation in the verdict. It is only extreme bias, not the "light im-
pressions" or modest preconceptions that all citizens bring with them into the jury
box, that undermines the constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury. 188 Neither
are the "gentle biases" something to fear.
III. BALANCING THE VALUE OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES TO
PROSECUTORS AGAINST THE DAMAGE TO ACTUAL OR
PERCEIVED FAIRNESS OF THE SYSTEM
Peremptory challenges are not constitutionally guaranteed. Rather, they are a
prophylactic safeguard of a constitutional right to an impartial jury. In performing
a cost-benefit analysis, one must ask: what exactly is the value of the peremptory
challenge to a prosecutor? Why do prosecutors (and all trial lawyers) maintain a
white-knuckle grip on the right to exercise peremptory challenges, even in the
face of evidence that they lack utility? The answer seems to be a belief that being
able to "kick off' the jurors a prosecutor "feels" are problematic, even if she
cannot identify a justifiable for-cause reason, makes the prosecutor feel more in
control. But this "feeling" of an appearance of fairness, or confidence in the
verdict is a luxury that should be afforded individual litigants, not public
"quasi-judicial officers."
185. Id. at 246-47 (footnotes omitted).
186. See Comment, The Sixth Amendment: Limiting the Use of Peremptory Challenges, 16J. MARSHALL L.
REv. 349, 360 (1983); Note, Peremptory Challenges and the Meaning of Jury Representation, 89 YALE L.J.
1177, 1189 (1980).
187. Angela J. Davis, The People v. Orenthal James Simpson: Race and Trial Advocacy, in TRIAL STORIES
283, 301 (Michael E. Tigar & Angela J. Davis eds., 2008).
188. See Mark Cammack, In Search of the Post-Positivist Jury, 70 IND. L.J. 450 (1995).
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A. THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR: A HIGHER DUTY?
Although the American trial system has been likened to an arena in which
mental combatants fight "to the death" (the verdict), each warrior similarly
skilled and equally committed to vanquishing the other in a forum with formal
rules of engagement enforced by a learned and impartial judge, the role of the
prosecutor is qualitatively different than that of other lawyers.1 89 Prosecuting
attorneys are generally held to a different, and some have said higher, standard
than attorneys representing clients.1 90 The roles of prosecutor and defense
counsel are not symmetrical. 191 The defense attorney is charged only with her
client's well-being; she has no corresponding "duty" to the government during
the course of the case.1 92 Not so for the prosecutor. The ethical duty of the
prosecuting attorney goes beyond advocacy; unlike other trial lawyers, the
prosecutor is duty-bound to "seek justice." 19 3 This responsibility to seek justice
includes a duty "to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice."'1 94
In the forward to the first edition of Joseph Lawless' Prosecutorial Miscon-
duct, Harvard Law School Professor Alan Dershowitz notes that "[d]espite the
theoretically adversarial nature of our system, the prosecutor is among the most
important arbiters of justice" due to her discretion in investigating and resolving
criminal matters, thus elevating her to a "quasi-judicial" role.1 95 The fact that the
use of peremptory challenges has been indicted on several scores, not the least of
which is the perpetuation of unconstitutional discrimination in the courtroom,
should be enough to make a prosecutor reconsider the discretionary use of such
189. MODEL CODE EC 7-13 ("The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual
advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict.") (citation omitted).
190. See, e.g., Ross Galin, Note, Above the Law: The Prosecutor's Duty to Seek Justice and the Performance
of Substantial Assistance Agreements, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 1245, 1265 (2000); Leslie C. Griffin, The Prudent
Prosecutor, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETIcs 259 (2001); Samuel J. Levine, Taking Prosecutorial Ethics Seriously: A
Consideration of the Prosecutor's Ethical Obligation to "Seek Justice" in a Comparative Analytical
Framework, 41 Hous. L. REV. 1337, 1347 (2004).
191. See R. MICHAEL CASSIDY, PROSECUTORIAL EThics 3 (2005) (footnote omitted) ("Unlike other advocates,
who have a duty to pursue their clients' interests vigorously within the bounds of the law, the prosecutor has
obligations of even-handedness precisely because he does not represent an individual but rather the collective
good. Procedural and substantive fairness to persons accused of crime is one element of a just society.
Therefore, by nature the prosecutor's loyalties are not undivided.... Because the defendant is one member of
the society that the prosecutor 'represents,' the prosecutor must take the defendant's interests into account in
assessing the validity of the prosecution.").
192. As discussed supra note 15, while the actions of a government defense lawyer who exercises
peremptory challenges without rational basis might qualify as "arbitrary and capricious," the discussion of
defense counsel duties is outside the scope of this Article. Note, however, that arguments in favor of prosecutors
voluntarily waiving peremptory challenges weigh persuasively in favor of their elimination entirely.
193. See MODEL RULES R. 3.8 cmt. 1 ("A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not
simply that of an advocate."); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTnON STANDARD 3-1.2(b) (3d ed. 1993) ("The prosecutor is an administrator of justice ...."); MODEL CODE
EC 7-13 (1998) ("[A prosecutor's] duty is to seek justice.").
194. MODEL RULES R. 3.8 cmt. 1.
195. Alan M. Dershowitz, Foreword to JOSEPH F. LAWLESS, JR., PROSECUTORIAL MiscoNDucr, at ix (1985).
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challenges. The legitimate purpose of peremptory challenges is to enable the
court and the attorneys to ensure that the final petit jury is unbiased and fair. 196
Attorneys, however, even criminal prosecutors, misuse peremptory chal-
lenges: they strive not to empanel an impartial jury, but to seat a jury that will
render a verdict for their side. Some prosecutors believe that if each side
aggressively pursues a jury biased in its favor, then each side will thwart the other
and the jury will end up somewhere in the middle, and thus "impartial." This
concept of attorneys as warriors, fiercely battling each issue with the belief that,
in the end, truth and justice will prevail is perverse in the context of criminal
prosecution. A prosecutor stands in the place of the sovereign "whose obligation
to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that
justice shall be done."' 197
The prosecution enjoys the full weight and power of *the government as it
enters a criminal trial. As such, a prosecutor is a "minister of justice" whose duty
is to seek justice, not merely convict.' 98 Jurists and scholars have opined on the
meaning of the prosecutor's role as a "minister of justice." Justice Douglas as-
serted that the prosecutor's role is "to vindicate the rights of people as expressed
in the laws and give those accused of crime a fair trial."' 99 In Berger v. United
States, the Court emphasized that the prosecutor's interest in a criminal case is
not to win but to see that justice is done:
He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But,
while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as
much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a
wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just
one.
20 0
Not only is the ethical duty of the prosecutor weightier, but commentators have
called for a "moral standard" as well, given the immense, unregulated discretion-
ary power of the prosecutor's office:
201
Why a standard of moral certainty? Such a standard fits the reality that the
prosecutor is the gatekeeper of justice. It requires the prosecutor to engage in a
rigorous moral dialogue in the context of factual, political, experiential, and
ethical considerations. It also requires the prosecutor to make and give effect to
the kinds of bedrock value judgments that underlie our system of justice-that
196. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202.218-20 (1965).
197. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
198. MODEL RuLES R. 3.8 cmt. 1; see also STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JuSTICE 3-1.2 (1993).
199. Donnelly v DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 649 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
200. Berger, 295 U.S. at 88.
201. See, e.g., Bennett L. Gershman, A Moral Standard for the Prosecutor's Exercise of the Charging
Discretion, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 513,514 (1993).
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the objective of convicting guilty persons is outweighed by the objective of
ensuring that innocent persons are not punished.2 °2
A prosecutor cannot deny that peremptory challenges may be exercised
discriminatorily and unconstitutionally at least occasionally by some of the
lawyers in her office. In addition, prosecutors routinely fail to elicit adequate
information about prospective jurors to form rational reasons for excusing jurors
peremptorily, which raises an entirely separate concern about the unconstitution-
ality of a prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges as a non-rational,
arbitrary,20 3 and capricious act by the government. 20 4 The prosecutor's goal
should be fair and constitutional conviction, not conviction by any means, even if
those means are sanctioned by the legislature.20 5
B. A VIEW OF PROSECUTION WITHOUT PEREMPTORIES: A RESPONSE TO
ANTICIPATED CONCERNS
Prosecutors presented with a proposal of life without peremptory challenges
have asked: "What would voir dire without prosecutorial peremptories look
like?" The answer is: "It would look very much the same." Like other trial
lawyers, as documented in study after study,20 6 prosecutors likely use a good deal
of the time allotted for questioning to educate, indoctrinate, and build rapport
with jurors rather than to seek out information across the entire venire adequate to
evaluate the potential jurors' biases.20 7 This may be the "highest and best use" of
202. Id. at 522. Some have called for all attorneys "to accept moral responsibility for the consequences of
their professional actions ... [and] consider all the societal interests at issue .. " DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE
INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION 51 (2000).
203. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 26.
204. See Note, Due Process Limits on Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenges, 102 HARV. L. Rev. 1013 (1989)
(arguing that "prosecutorial peremptory challenges, as potentially arbitrary and capricious government action,
violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment").
205. As Law Professor and Rabbi Samuel Levine notes, when a lawyer is faced with an ethical challenge of
choosing between conflicting harms (here, a prosecutor's worry that a voluntary and unilateral waiver of
peremptory challenges may result in a reduced probability of conviction versus a realization that an exercise of
peremptories may result in an increased probability of unconstitutional discrimination), Jewish law may be
instructive:
Because they present a choice between conflicting harms, these situations require considerations
beyond the range of ordinary normative ethical analysis. Instead, under such exceptional circum-
stances, the analysis may include a careful balancing of the relative degree of benefit and harm
resulting from each of the alternatives. The resolution of-such analysis may prescribe action that,
although generally prohibited, may qualify in rare cases as ethically proper conduct.
Samuel J. Levine, Taking Prosecutorial Ethics Seriously: A Consideration of the Prosecutor's Ethical
Obligation to "Seek Justice" in a Comparative Analytical Framework, 41 Hous. L. REv. 1337, 1363 (2004).
206. See supra notes 128 and 131 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Balch, supra note 128, at 271-83;
Broeder, supra note 101, at 522.
207. This is consistent with my own training as a prosecutor in the King County Prosecuting Attorney's
Office in Seattle, Washington. At a training by the Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys,
prosecutors were instructed that the "primary purpose of voir dire" was to (a) "[allert [jurors] to Legal and
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the truncated time available for voir dire, given lawyers' poor ability to gather
and cross-correlate information about scores of individuals over a multitude of
issues in a meaningful way that produces reliably predictive results. A waiver of
peremptory challenges, however, would not affect a prosecutor's use of voir dire
to gather information for challenges for cause, to build rapport and credibility
with the jurors, or to sensitize jurors to themes and issues in the case.20 8
Prosecutors would still engage in active voir dire questioning. They would just
refrain from employing peremptory challenges. To this extent, then, the voir dire
would look very much the same as it does now.
One concern voiced by prosecutors in opposition to a voluntary waiver of
peremptory challenges is that such waiver would constitute an abrogation of the
duty owed to the citizenry to zealously prosecute to the full extent of the law.
Why, they ask, should a prosecutor give up a weapon in her arsenal when the
defense will retain it? Would that not result in an unequal playing field? This
argument carries weight when applied to civil litigants with symmetrical roles at
trial. 2° In the case of governmental prosecution, however, it erroneously buys
into a view of the courtroom as a playing field or battlefield210 that ignores both
the prosecutor's higher duty to "seek justice 21  as well as the absence of any
Factual Issues they will be facing- (b) Impress on them the equities of your case.' Chuck Lind, LAWYERS ARE
FROM MARS, JURORS ARE FROM EARTH 1, WAPA District Court Training Program, CJTC (June 5-6, 1998). Of
the top five points of "General Strategy for Voir Dire," number two was 'Think about the best demographic
group for your case," (a technique social science has established is unreliable and scholars roundly criticize as
employing unconstitutional discriminatory stereotyping), and number. five was "Trust your Instincts" (the
"hunch" factor, which by necessity is premised on the preconceptions, biases, and prejudices of the examining
attorney). Id. Prosecutorial training materials for a neighboring county, however, caution that "Voir dire
questions should be asked 'solely to obtain information for the intelligent exercise of challenges .... A
prosecutor should not argue the prosecution's case to the jury during the jury selection process."' Jeffery J.
Jahns, TiE QUEST FOR JUSTICE: PROSECUTORIAL ETHICS AND PROFESSIONALISM (3d ed. 2008). Jahns cites
Washington state rules CrR 6.4(b), and CrRLJ 6.4(b), which provide that a voir dire examination shall be
conducted "for the purpose of discovering any basis for challenge for cause and for the purpose of gaining
knowledge to enable an intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges." Id. (citing Wash. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 6.4
(2000); Wash. Ct. Ltd. Jur. 6.4 (1987)). The materials note that "a trial court is granted great discretion in
determining how best to conduct the scope and content of voir dire." Id. (citing State v. Davis, 10 P.3d 977, 995
(2000)).
208. Assuming this is permitted in a particular jurisdiction. Some judges exercise judicial discretion and
prohibit such use of voir dire, while in some jurisdictions this use of voir dire may be barred by court rule.
209. When private citizens challenge each other in a civil lawsuit there is also, as the Supreme Court noted in
the criminal case of Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965) (quoting In re Murcheson, 349 U.S. 133, 136
(1955)), a value in permitting the parties to assure themselves the jury is impartial, thus furthering the
"appearance of justice."
210. "The competitive and combative nature of modem adversary proceedings... has changed many
prosecutors from champions ofjustice to advocates of victory." Catherine Ferguson-Gilbert, Comment, It is Not
Whether You Win or Lose, It is How You Play the Game: Is the Win-Loss Scorekeeping Mentality Doing Justice
for Prosecutors?, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 283,289 (2001) (citing JOSEPH LAwLESS, JR., PROSECuTORIAL MISCONDUCr
§ 1.17 (2d ed., Matthew Bender & Co. 1999)).
211. MODEL RULES R. 3.8 cmt. 1.
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corresponding duty on the part of the defense.212 A prosecutor shall "strive not for
'courtroom victories'.., but for results that best serve the overall interests of
justice .... 23 She has a duty to "seek to reform and improve the administration
of criminal justice. '21 4 She is also duty-bound to try to correct substantive and
procedural inadequacies or injustices.21 5 These duties do not extend to the
defense, creating an asymmetrical relationship between the parties that undercuts
any argument for tactical parity with respect to peremptory challenges.
Moreover, within the criminal law there exist rules and standards ihat manifest
a public policy that the prosecution is not entitled to the same benefits and
protections available to the defense. Most pertinent to a prosecutor's concern
about having unequal access to peremptories is the fact that, with respect to
non-capital felonies, the prosecution already has fewer peremptory challenges
than the defense in many states216 as well as in the federal system. 217 Thus, there
is already an acceptance in some jurisdictions that there need not be an equal
number of peremptory challenges afforded the prosecution and the defense.2 t8
The disparity in the allocated number of peremptories between prosecution and
defense may well recognize the fact that although jurors may be summoned
across all sectors of society, not all citizens are willing to respond for duty when
called. No jurisdiction has a one-hundred percent response rate to its jury
summonses, and in many jurisdictions the response rate is less than fifty
212. JOSEPH E LAWLESS, 1-1 PROSECUTORIAL MISCoNDuCr § 1.17 (LexisNexis 2009); see also R. MICHAEL
CASSIDY, PROSECuToRIAL ETHICS 3 (Thompson/West 2005).
213. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNcTION § 3-1.3 cmt. 9 (3d
ed. 1993).
214. Id. at § 3-1.2.
215. Id.
216. See Gurney, supra note 5, at 228-29; see also JuRy TRIAL, supra note 61. States providing more
peremptories to the defendant than to prosecutors include: Arkansas (six State; eight Defense), ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 16-33-305 (West 2009); Maryland (ten State, twenty Defense for crimes punishable by life imprisonment; five
State, ten Defense for crimes punishable by at least twenty years imprisonment; four State, four Defense for all
other crimes), MD. CODE ANN., [CTs. & JuD. PRoC.] § 8-420 (West 2009); Minnesota (nine State, fifteen Defense
for crimes publishable by life imprisonment; three State, five Defense for all other crimes), MINN. STAT. ANN
§ 26.02 (West 2009); New Jersey (ten State, twenty Defense for an indictment for kidnapping, murder,
aggravated manslaughter, manslaughter, aggravated assault, aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault,
aggravated criminal sexual contact, aggravated arson, arson, burglary, robbery, forgery if it constitutes a crime
of the third degree as defined by subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:21-1, or perjury; ten State, ten Defense for all other
crimes), N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2B:23-13 (West 2009); New Mexico (eight State, twelve Defense for crimes
punishable by life imprisonment; three State, five Defense for all other crimes), N.M. STAT. ANN. § 5-606 (West
2009); South Carolina (five State, ten Defense, for indictment of murder, man-
slaughter, burglary, arson, criminal sexual conduct, armed robbery, grand larceny, or breach of trust when it is
punishable as for grand larceny, pejury, or forgery; five State, five Defense for all other crimes), S.C. CODE
ANN. § 14-7-1110 (2008); West Virginia (two State, six Defense), W. Va. R. Crim. P., Rule 24 (b) (2009).
217. In the federal system, the government is allotted six, compared to the defense's ten peremptory
challenges. FED. R. CPlM. P. 24(b) (2009).
218. This policy has existed for decades. See Gurney, supra note 5, at 228-29. See also JuRY TRIAL, supra
note 61. It was recognized in the English system as well, which eliminated peremptory challenges for
prosecutors in criminal actions in 1825.
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percent.2'9 Logic suggests that individuals who self-select and obediently
respond to the court's direction to appear and serve on jury duty are more likely to
be law-abiding citizens than anarchists or constitutionalists who are hostile to the
government, the police, and/or the judicial system. One might argue, then, that
the venire is already stacked against the defendant, entitling him to a dispropor-
tionate number of peremptory challenges.
In other areas of criminal law practice, the prosecution carries a disproportion-
ate burden as a matter of public policy. One example is the duty to produce
exculpatory evidence to the defense-voluntarily and without request. 220 The
prosecutor may also have a duty to search for evidence that may potentially
damage her case. 22' The defense has no corresponding duty, and yet this disparity
is not criticized by prosecutors as unfair. Likewise, prosecutors have a different
duty than defense counsel with respect to witness examination. A prosecutor
cannot cross-examine a defense witness to attack his credibility for truthfulness
when she knows the witness is truthful.222 A defense attorney, however, is not
likewise so clearly prohibited.223 Nor can a prosecutor call a witness to the stand
whom she knows is likely to perjure himself. In some jurisdictions, however, a
defense lawyer may allow the defendant to testify in the narrative, even when
aware the testimony will be false.22"
219. Nationally, the response to summons for jury duty for one-step courts is reported to average 45.8%.
GREGORY E. Mzm, PAULA HANNAFORD-AGOR & NICOLE L. WATERS, TIE STATE-OF-THE-STATES SURVEY OF JURY
IMPROVEMENT EFFORTS: A COMPENDIUM REPORT (Apr. 2007). In Washington State, the rate of response across
multiple jurisdictions ranges from 23% to 40%. Jury Research Project: Report to the Washington State
Legislature, Washington State Center for Court Research, Dec. 24, 2008. In King County, Washington (where
Seattle is located), the response rate has plummeted as low as 15%. Darrell Glover, More and More Guilty of
Shirking Jury Duty Low Pay May Explain the 15% Turnout, SEATrLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 5, 1998. In
1996, Polk County, Iowa (where Des Moines is located) had a similar response rate. In a given month, only 180
citizens were available for jury duty of 750 summoned to serve. See V. HALE START & MARK McCORMICK, JURY
SELECTION § 9.06, 296 (3d ed. 2001) (citing Frank Santiago, THE DES MOINES REGISTER, Apr. 21, 1996); see also
J. Clark Kelso, Final Report of the Blue Ribbon Commission on Jury System Improvement, 47 HASTINGS L.J.
1433 (July-Aug. 1996) (reporting that in Los Angeles, of the almost 4 million juror affidavits mailed in 1994-95,
only ten percent were qualified and summoned and only half of those, a total of 172,154 persons, actually served
on juries, representing an "overall yield" of about five percent for Los Angeles County).
220. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
221. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3-3.11 (3d ed.
1993).
222. See id. at § 3-5.7 ("A prosecutor should not use the power of cross-examination to discredit or
undermine a witness if the prosecutor knows the witness is testifying truthfully.").
223. MONROE H. FREEDMAN & AiBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICs 306-07 (3d ed., 2004). Mr.
Freedman and Ms. Smith give several explanations for the defense's unilateral ability to impugn the truthfulness
of a prosecution witness at trial and then write: "None of those rationales ... would justify a prosecutor in
making a defense witness appear to be testifying inaccurately or untruthfully when the prosecutor knows that
the witness is testifying accurately and truthfully." Id.
224. In many jurisdictions, a criminal defense lawyer may put her client on the stand to give narrative
testimony, even if she knows it is false. In 1971, the ABA approved Standard 7.7 of the ABA Standards for
Criminal Justice, allowing a criminal defendant to testify in narrative fashion without the assistance of direct
examination and without the lawyer's arguing the false testimony in closing argument. In a widely cited 1978
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There also exists precedent for such a voluntary unilateral waiver of an
advantageous trial tactic: instances in which prosecutors have implemented
waivers of a "right" afforded them in furtherance of actual or perceived fairness.
One example is a blanket waiver by a prosecutorial office of the right to file an
Ninth Circuit decision approving the use of this narrative approach, Standard 7.7 was described as representing
an "authoritative consensus." Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727, 730 n.1 (9th Cir. 1978). However, there is
contrary dictum in the majority opinion in Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986), suggesting that, under the
relevant Model Code and Model Rules provisions, a criminal defense lawyer must disclose the proposed perjury
to the judge if the lawyer is not permitted to withdraw. In Nix, the Supreme Court appeared to condemn the
narrative testimony approach as passive tolerance of perjury. 475 U.S. at 163 n.6. After Nix, the ABA advised
that a lawyer's conduct should be consistent with the confidentiality protections of Model Rule 1.6, and yet not
violate Model Rule 3.3. If a lawyer can neither dissuade her client from testifying falsely nor effectively
withdraw, and the client wants to testify, the lawyer must disclose the client's intention to commit perjury to the
court. ABA Formal Ethics Op. 87-353 (1987). Some authority suggests a lawyer should tell the court only that
her client insists on testifying but that counsel will be unable to conduct an examination. Connecticut Informal
Ethics Op. 91-13 (1991). Despite the Nix dictum and the ABA's decision to no longer approve the practice in the
Defense Function Standards, the narrative approach has continued to receive acceptance in criminal trials. See,
e.g., Benedict v. Henderson, 721 F. Supp. 1560 (N.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd mem., 904 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1990)
(asserting in dicta that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is not violated if lawyer who believes client will
commit perjury requests narrative form of testimony); Shockley v. State, 565 A.2d 1373 (Del. 1989) (holding
narrative form of testimony may be used even after Nix); People v. Guzman, 248 Cal. Rptr. 467 (Cal. 1988)
(concluding narrative approach was not inconsistent with defendant's constitutional rights and did not violate
lawyer's duty to refrain from offering false evidence); People v. Gadson, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 219 (Cal. Ct. App.
1993) (approving use of narrative testimony by two defense witness as well as by criminal defendant); State v.
Waggoner, 864 P.2d 162 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993) (holding that mistrial was properly denied after counsel
disclosed to court that defendant would testify in narrative form; counsel avoided assisting perjury by
presenting narrative form of testimony); People v. Taggart, 599 N.E.2d 501 (ill. App. Ct. 1992) (holding that
defendant not denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by being required to testify in narrative form);
Reynolds v. State, 625 N.E.2d 1319 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that defendant not entitled to mistrial where
trial court permitted lawyer to present defendant's testimony in narrative form); Commonwealth v. Jermyn, 620
A.2d 1128 (Pa. 1993) (holding that lawyer who believed client would lie on stand acted reasonably within
constraints of ethics requirement by telling client he could testify in narrative fashion but that lawyer would not
ask him questions); State v. Layton, 432 S.E.2d 740 (W. Va. 1993) (concluding that when criminal defendant
indicates that he is contemplating committing perjury during his testimony, it is not error or denial of his
constitutional right to assistance of counsel for trial court to direct attorney to refrain from examining defendant
and to rule that defendant must testify in narrative fashion). But see Stephenson v. State, 424 S.E.2d 816, 818 n. I
(Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (asserting in dicta that narrative testimony would constitute participation in fraud). The
narrative testimony approach is codified in District of Columbia Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3(b) and in
Tennessee Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3(b). See also MODEL RULES R. 3.3 cmt. 7 (acknowledging that some
courts embrace narrative approach). This approach garnered the approval of several ethics committees and
commentators in the decade following Nix. E.g., Connecticut Formal Ethics Op. 42; Connecticut Informal
Ethics Op. 91-13 (1991); District of Columbia Ethics Op. 234 (1993); Normal Lefstein, Legal Ethics-
Reflections on the Client Perjury Dilemma and Nix v. Whiteside, 1 CIuM. JUST. 27 (Summer 1986) (arguing that
narrative testimony approach is best solution to client perjury dilemma); Norman Lefstein, Client Perjury in
Criminal Cases: Still in Search of an Answer, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 521 (1988) (endorsing narrative approach
after comparing its merits relative to option of informing court). See also John Wesley Hall, Handling Client
Perjury After Nix v. Whiteside: A Criminal Defense Lawyer's View, 42 MERCER L. REV. 769, 808 (1991)
(contending that while free narrative is not a perfect answer, it is constitutionally protected when conscientious
counsel deems it necessary; suggesting that client could also be questioned carefully to avoid perjury);
ABA/BNA Lawyers Manual on Professional Conduct 61:419-29.
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affidavit of prejudice 225 against an assigned judge, causing the case to be
reassigned to a different judge.226 And although unable to find a prosecutor's
office with a formal policy waiving peremptory challenges, I found several
individual prosecutors who routinely waived peremptory challenges throughout
their careers for many of the reasons discussed above, even if it wasn't an
"official office policy" to do so.
One such prosecutor was Rex Bell, the elected prosecutor of Clark County,
Nevada, who had a career-long policy against using peremptory challenges. He
recounted to me227 that in the 133 jury trials he tried over 24 years as a
prosecutor, he never once exercised a peremptory challenge.228 He explained that
if the prospective juror showed up for jury duty and swore he could be fair, who
was Mr. Bell to call him a liar? He found such a waiver, in his opinion, did not
harm his cases. To the contrary, he believes it made the jury like him more.229
Another prosecutorial concern is "[w]hat happens if the judge refuses to
excuse a juror challenged by the prosecution for cause?" The conventional
wisdom is that peremptory challenges are needed as "back up" because chal-
lenges for cause are overly narrow, both in statutory definition and judicial
application. Commentators have noted judicial reluctance to grant challenges for
cause.230 This may be particularly true in jurisdictions where judges are subject to
reelection, and arguably function as quasi-politicians.23t Prosecutors maintain
225. In most jurisdictions, a party may seek the disqualification of an assigned judge, usually by filing an
affidavit attesting to a belief the judge could not be fair to the party or the party's attorney. See, e.g., WASH. REV.
CODE § 4.12.050 (2009).
226. This was the policy of the King County Prosecuting Attorney's Office as explained to me in my initial
training in 1998.
227. Telephone Interview with Rex Bell (October 14, 2009).
228. Curiously, and in further indictment of attorney skill with the use of peremptory challenges, Mr. Bell
recounts the singular time he feared he would be forced to use a peremptory to excuse a prospective juror. Upon
entering the courtroom for a criminal trial, he saw a woman in the venire who had been the wife in a hostile
divorce case wherein Mr. Bell had represented the husband pro bono. It was his belief that the woman despised
him, and he predicted he would have no choice but to excuse her from the jury. When the judge, however, asked
if anyone was acquainted with the defendant or the attorneys, the woman raised her hand and dutifully admitted
that she knew the prosecutor, Mr. Bell. Defense counsel, without inquiring further, used a defense peremptory
challenge to excuse her, quite to Mr. Bell's relief and amusement.
229. While Mr. Bell was too humble to allow me to report his win/loss record in this article, let me say that
although it does not match Gerry Spence's perfect trial record, see infra note 258, it is pretty darned close. Mr.
Bell is not only well known for his trial skill; he is also known for his accomplishments as a rodeo cowboy. His
father, also Rex Bell, was a cowboy in early motion pictures, when he met Mr. Bell's mother, movie star Clara
Bow, the "It" girl of the 1920's. Clara Bow, Encyclopedia Britannica Online, http://www.britannica.coml
EBchecked/topicf76054/Clara-Bow (last visited Feb. 18, 2010).
230. See, e.g., Gurney, supra note 5, at 266; Barat S. McClain, Note, Turner's Acceptance of Limited Voir
Dire Renders Batson's Equal Protection a Hollow Promise, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REv 273, 282-283 n.64 (1989);
Charles J. Ogletree, Just Say No!: A Proposal to Eliminate Racially Discriminatory Uses of Peremptory
Challenges, 31 Am. CRIM. L. REv. 1099, 1134 (1994); Mary R. Rose & Shari Seidman Diamond, Judging Bias:
Juror Confidence and Judicial Rulings on Challenges for Cause, 42 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 513, 517 (Sept. 2008).
231. Researchers Rose and Diamond found judges experience a "distinctive social relationship with jurors"
that increases a judge's discomfort when dismissing a juror for cause because it is "a public declaration about a
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that it is only the availability of peremptory challenges that allows them to
remove a juror who has demonstrated a likelihood of bias, but who has been
aggressively rehabilitated by the judge, agreeing to "put aside" his or her feelings
or life experiences in the course of jury duty.232
Commentators have observed that some judges engage in "aggressive
rehabilitation," asking challenged jurors if they could set aside their experiences
and feelings and follow the judge's orders to look only at the facts of the case and
apply the law as given to them by the judge.2 3 3 Just as in the case of educational
voir dire2 3 4 the judge's questioning telegraphs to the juror that if the juror is to
maintain any semblance of intelligence and fairness the juror is expected to
answer, "yes, I can set aside my feelings." When a trial lawyer faces a prospective
juror who has been "rehabilitated" by the judge in this manner, there lingers,
understandably, a concern that the juror may have been publicly cowed into a
commitment of neutrality that will not survive the trial and into the jury
deliberation room. In such cases, lawyers routinely fall back on a peremptory
challenge to do that which the judge should have done: excuse the juror from
service. The ability to fall back on a peremptory challenge and excuse a juror who
has been unsuccessfully challenged for cause is particularly attractive when the
court requires such challenges to be made publicly in the courtroom, rather than
at sidebar. The juror, now aware she has been challenged, may harbor some
resentment towards the prosecutor.23
This concern argues for a broader definition and application of a challenge for
cause, not necessarily retention of the current peremptory challenge practice.
236
Some scholars who have called for the abolition of peremptory challenges have
also proposed an expanded definition of a for-cause challenge to include "any
sound, strategic, nondiscriminatory reason why trial counsel might doubt a
person's fitness to serve, and they do so as the official arbiters of bias." Rose & Diamond, supra note 230, at
539-40.
232. A judge's refusal to dismiss a juror for cause despite a party's or attorney's belief that the prospective
juror is biased is not exclusively limited to the case of judicial rehabilitation. Researchers Rose and Diamond
found that judges' decisions to deny a for-cause challenge may be based on a number of factors, including
uncertainty about the decisions, consideration of the appellate record, and a reluctance to be perceived as
rejecting the juror as untruthful. See id. at 539.
233. See generally Christopher A. Cosper, Rehabilitation of the Juror Rehabilitation Doctrine, 37 GA. L.
REV. 1471, 1488 (2003); Valerie P. Hans & Alayna Jehle, Avoid Bald Men and People with Green Socks? Other
Ways to Improve the Voir Dire Process in Jury Selection, 78 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 1179, 1194 (2003); Roger Shuy,
How a Judge's Voir Dire can Teach a Jury What to Say, 6 DiSCOURSE & Soc'Y 207 (1995); Marvin Zalman &
Olga Tsoudis, Plucking Weeds from the Garden: Lawyers Speak about Voir Dire, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 163 (2005).
See also Susan E. Jones, Judge- Versus Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire, 11 LAW & HUM. BE HAv. 131, 142 (1987)
(jurors altered responses more when questioned by the judge).
234. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
235. Where, for example, the judge has the attorneys make their challenges for cause in open court before the
venire.
236. See, e.g., Note, Due Process Limits on Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenges, 102 HARv. L REv. 1013
(1989).
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juror's impartiality' or capacity to perform." '237 A prosecutor's office known to
have adopted a blanket waiver of peremptory challenges would be well-situated
to lobby the legislature with respect to an expanded statutory definition of a
for-cause challenge. Judges, too, once aware of a prosecutorial policy against
exercising peremptory challenges, would likely have incentive to relax the
in-court application of the for-cause challenge, abstaining, for example, from
aggressive rehabilitation of a challenged juror. The adoption of a "no peremp-
tory" policy by a prosecutor's office might then set in motion what two decades
of scholars could not achieve: the reevaluation of the definition and application of
the for-cause challenge by lawmakers and judges. This is arguably the exact
service a prosecutor is duty-bound to attempt when charged with the task "to
reform and improve the administration of criminal justice. 238 It does not,
however, address a prosecutor's immediate concern about what to do in the
interim, until the for-cause challenge is finally broadened. To understand the
concern, one must appreciate the practical interrelationship of the two types of
challenges.
As discussed above, a for-cause challenge must be based on specific,
demonstrable, and legally cognizable evidence of juror partiality.239 In federal
court, a for-cause challenge is "narrowly confined to instances in which threats to
impartiality are admitted or presumed from the relationship, pecuniary interest,
or clear biases of a prospective juror., 240 State statutes may provide additional
enumerated bases for such a challenge. A prospective juror is presumed impartial,
and the party raising the for-cause challenge bears the burden of proving bias.241
When ruling on the validity of the challenge, a judge excuses the juror for cause
only if she agrees the juror cannot serve impartially.
A judge enjoys great discretion regarding voir dire, and her decision to deny a
for-cause challenge is given great deference on appeal.24 Justice Rehnquist
stated:
Despite its importance, the adequacy of voir dire is not easily subject to
appellate review. The trial judge's function at this point in the trial is not unlike
237. See, e.g., Elaine A. Carlson, Batson, J.E.B., and Beyond: The Paradoxical Quest for Reasoned
Peremptory Strikes in the Jury Selection Process, 46 BAYLOR L. REV. 947, 1003 (quoting Alen v. Florida, 596
So. 2d 1083, 1090 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)).
238. A.B.A. CRIM. JUST. SEC. PROSECUrION FUNCTION STANDARDS § 3-1.2.
239. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text. Examples of specific reasons justifying a for-cause
challenge include conflict of interest, potential bias, or lack of candor. The Supreme Court has stated that a trial
judge should not excuse a potential juror for cause unless the juror's views will "prevent or substantially impair
the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath." Wainwright v. Witt,
469 U.S. 412, 424 n.5 (1985) (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980)).
240. Darbin v. Nourse, 662 F.2d 1109, 1113 (9th Cir. 1981).
241. See United States v. Jones, 608 F.2d 1004, 1007 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1086 (1980).
242. This broad discretion has been criticized by some judges and scholars. See, e.g., THE LAW OF JURIES,
supra note 16, at 111-14 ("It could be argued that even if a trial judge's determination of 'actual bias' or lack
thereof is entitled to deference that not be the case with issues of 'implied bias'....").
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that of the jurors later on in the trial. Both must reach conclusions as to
impartiality and credibility by relying on their own evaluations of demeanor
evidence and of responses to questions.
24 3
Although a challenge for implied bias lies within the sound discretion of the
judge, a judge must grant a challenge for cause if the juror in question has
demonstrated actual prejudice or bias. 244 The judge must excuse a juror who
demonstrates actual bias because it may force the parties to unnecessarily use a
peremptory challenge on the juror, "abridging the purpose behind... peremptory
challenges. 2 45 Actual bias, however, is rarely established because it requires
direct rather than circumstantial evidence; as a practical matter, this means the
juror's own admission of bias.2 46
A trial judge's finding of impartiality may only be overturned for "manifest
error.' 24 7 Where the reviewing court finds such error, which is rare given the
great deference given to the trial court, it may still be subject to a traditional
"harmless error" analysis. 248 Generally, a judge's erroneous refusal to excuse a
biased juror is not reversible error unless it "causes a prejudicial diminution of
peremptory challenges. 2 49 In many jurisdictions, this means that a judge's denial
of a for-cause challenge-even if wrong-will not generally be overturned on
appeal unless the challenging party both exercises a peremptory challenge
against the challenged juror and exhausts all his peremptories.2 5 ° In practice, a
lawyer who fails to win a for-cause challenge usually excuses the challenged
juror with a peremptory challenge. Having removed the juror, that particular juror
can no longer be a designated "harm" on appeal. The "harm," then, must be the
reverberating effect of the forced use of the peremptory challenge: the "prejudi-
cial diminution" of peremptories that leaves the challenging party with an
unfavorable juror seated during the trial for lack of a peremptory challenge
243. Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 424 (1991) (quoting Rosales-Lopez v. U.S., 451 U.S. 182, 188
(1981)).
244. United States v. Apodaca, 666 F.2d 89, 94 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 823 (1982).
245. United States v. Daly, 716 F.2d 1499, 1507 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 465 U.S. 1075 (1984).
246. See, e.g., Sharon R. Gromer, Note, Sixth Amendment - The Demise of the Doctrine of Implied Juror
Bias, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINoLOGY 1507, 1516 (1982); Dean A. Stowers, Note, Juror Bias Undiscovered
During Voir Dire: Legal Standards for Reviewing Claims of a Denial of the Constitutional Right to an Impartial
Jury, 39 DRAKE L. REV. 201,203 (1989), cited in Joshua S. Press, Untruthful Jurors in the Federal Courts: Have
We Become Comfortably Numb?, 21 ST. THoMAs L. REV. 253, 264 (2009).
247. Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at 428.
248. If the denial constitutes a constitutional violation integral to a fair trial, it cannot be treated as harmless
error. See Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648,668 (1987).
249. Daly, 716 F.2d at 1507.
250. Id; cf. State v. Fire, 34 P.3d 1218 (Wash. 2001) (noting that a criminal defendant can win reversal on
appeal after conviction if he can show that the trial judge abused discretion in denying the for-cause challenge
even without using peremptory challenge to remove juror in question); State v. Gonzales, 45 P.3d 205 (Wash.
2002), rev. denied, 62 P.3d 890 (Wash. 2003) (finding that where a potential juror admits bias, a criminal
defendant need not exhaust all peremptory challenges and remove the juror to preserve the issue for successful
appeal if the judge erred in denying defendant's for-cause challenge to the juror).
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option. An unfavorable verdict alone will not establish prejudice; the challenging
party must show that a biased individual ended up serving on the jury because the
party ran out of peremptory challenges.
-Prosecutors argue that this appellate standard is problematic for a prosecutor
adopting a blanket waiver of peremptory challenges. Any questionable denial of a
for-cause challenge would force the prosecutor to consider an interlocutory
appeal because if the jury acquits, double-jeopardy attaches and the issue is not
subject to appeal. Even if the interim appeal request is granted, the standard of
review would still prove a substantial impediment. In evaluating the magnitude
of this potential problem, it would be useful to know the number of for-cause
challenges a prosecutor exercises, on average, and the percentage of those
challenges that are denied by the court. Unfortunately, there is scant data on the
percentage of jurors challenged for cause and the percentage of those excused by
the court.25 1
One response to this appellate concern would be an amendment to the blanket
peremptory waiver proposal allowing the use of peremptory challenges exclu-
sively as a fall back when a for-cause challenge is not granted by the court. This
"waiver-except" policy would force a prosecutor to resort to peremptory
challenges only when she had built a record demonstrating some objective issue
concerning a prospective juror's ability to serve, and was willing to challenge a
juror for cause by articulating to the court the juror's unfitness for service. This
would dramatically reduce the risk of impermissible exercises of peremptory
challenges because it would exclude those challenges based on the prosecutor's
hunches, gut instincts, or other feelings not subject to objective identification.
Where a citizen has responded to a summons for jury duty and not
demonstrated a mental infirmity or an inability to hear the case impartially, the
government should take that citizen as part of a fair cross-section of society. Not
only is this the "right" thing to do, but accepting the jurors without challenge may
actually help the prosecutor build credibility and rapport with the final petit jury.
Acknowledging that every potential juror has opinions and "light impressions," a
prosecutor should embrace the diversity of opinion that a community cross-
section brings to a venire, and, ultimately, the jury. This is the philosophy of trial
lawyer Gerry Spence,252 whose trial track record253 confirms he's doing some-
thing right:
251. One study found that approximately five percent of prospective jurors are excused for cause. See
VALERE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JuDGING THE JURY 71 (1986). I conducted an informal national survey of
current and former criminal trial lawyers and judges and asked them to share their observations about the
incidence of for-cause challenges by prosecutors. The responses ranged from "once per year" for one busy
prosecutor to "once per trial" for another. As to the percentage of those challenges granted by the court there was
more uniformity: on average, lawyers and judges reported that about half of the challenges were granted.
252. Gerry Spence has won several high-profile cases, including the Karen Silkwood case, the defense of
Randy Weaver at Ruby Ridge, the defense of Imelda Marcos, the case against Penthouse for Miss Wyoming,
and the murder defenses of Ed Cantrell and Sandy Jones. He is the founder and director of the non-profit Trial
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[A] person without an opinion on most things is an idiot... I begin with the
proposition that everyone has an opinion, but everyone is basically fair. The
questioning takes on the flavor of friends talking, accepting the other's opinions
and feelings with respect.... I've finished many a voir dire examination not
wanting to strike a single person from the original jury panel.254
A prosecutor confident in the strength of the evidence in her case should
approach voir dire with respect for and acceptance of the divergent experiences
and attitudes of citizens who have responded to a call for service. This acceptance
sends a strong message that the government can confidently meet its burden of
proof and persuade a jury representational of the community without resorting to
manipulation of the makeup of the jury.25 5
CONCLUSION
The use of peremptory challenges has questionable value and risks violating
the constitutional rights of both defendants and prospective jurors. A defendant is
guaranteed an impartial jury; a prosecutor attempts to thwart this constitutional
guarantee when trying to seat a jury biased in her favor. The prosecutor is
adequately protected from prospective jurors with "extreme" biases by exercising
challenges for cause, especially under an expanded definition and application of a
for-cause challenge. Instead of waiting for judges and legislators to respond to the
decades of criticism levied at the use of peremptory challenges and the narrow
definition and application of for-cause challenges, the prosecutor should "take the
high road" and waive peremptories.
Juror questioning during voir dire routinely fails to produce adequate useful
information about individual jurors' biases, attitudes, opinions, and experiences.
In the absence of such information, prosecutors cannot effectively and constitu-
tionally exercise peremptory challenges. Without individual juror information,
prosecutors are forced to exercise peremptory challenges based on group
affiliations, stereotypes, and demographic profiles. Not only does reliance on
demographics such as race and gender risk unconstitutional discrimination, it
Lawyers College. Trial Lawyers College, About Gerry Spence, http://www.triallawyerscollege.com/gerry/
bio.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2010).
253. Mr. Spence has not lost a jury trial since 1969 and has never lost a criminal case in the fifty years he has
practiced law. See Terry Carter, Spence's No-Loss Record Stands With Fieger Acquittal, A.B.A. J., June 2,2008,
available at http://www.abajoumal.com/news/spences no-loss-recordstandswith-fieger-acquittal.
254. GERRY SPENCE, WIN YOUR CASE: How TO PRESENT, PERSUADE, AND PREVAIL-EVERY PLACE, EVERY
TAE 112-13 (2005).
255. King County Superior Court Judge William Downing, a former state prosecutor, tells the story of apro
se litigant who, when given the opportunity to exercise peremptory challenges, took to his feet, smiled warmly
toward the jurors and said, "Gee, they all seem so nice, I'm just sorry we can't keep them all. I have no
challenges." The gentleman did not win his case but the judge told him it was one of the classiest moves he had
seen in his courtroom. When telling this tale to prosecutors, the judge has suggested they should project that
same confidence in their cases and respect for the community.
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does so without a documentable offsetting benefit to the prosecutor. There is little
evidence that the exercise of peremptory challenges by prosecutors increases the
likelihood of conviction, while there is ample evidence that such challenges are
routinely exercised unconstitutionally. For nearly two decades, legal scholars,
researchers, judges,25 6 and even prosecutors 257 have advocated for the wholesale
elimination of peremptory challenges, acknowledging their lack of efficacy and
risk of discrimination. Despite legislative reluctance to abolish them, it is time for
prosecutors to take the high road and, exercising their prosecutorial discretion,
voluntarily waive peremptory challenges.
256. E.g., Raymond J. Broderick, Why the Peremptory Challenge Should Be Abolished, 65 TEMP. L. REv.
369 (1992); Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should Be Abolished: A Trial Judge's Perspective, 64
U. Ci. L. REV. 809 (1997). But see Christopher E. Smith & Roxanne Ochoa, The Peremptory Challenge in the
Eyes of the Trial Judge, 79 JUDICATURE 185, 186 (1996).
257. One such prosecutor was my former boss, King County Prosecutor Norm Maleng (1939-2007) to whom
this article is dedicated. On September 30, 2006, Mr. Maleng attended a lecture I delivered at the University of
Washington law school on the American jury system wherein I argued for the elimination of peremptory
challenges. He approached me afterward and told me that he heartily agreed that peremptory challenges should
be eliminated.
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